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I. INTRODUCTION
Little attention is paid to the far reaches of the federal judicial sys-
tem, which extends beyond the boundaries of the continental United
States and even beyond the outermost states of Alaska and Hawaii; Pu-
erto Rico is part of the First Circuit,1 and the Virgin Islands are part of
the Third Circuit.2  Most particularly, the Ninth Circuit encompasses not
only Hawai’i but also the territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana
Islands (NMI).  Not only has the Ninth Circuit provided judges to hear
cases in the district courts in Guam and the NMI as needed and reviewed
cases appealed from those districts, but, through the circuit’s Pacific Is-
lands Committee—formerly the Pacific Territories Committee of the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States—it has also developed and helped
implement policy for those courts, including their relation to the Ninth
Circuit.
One judge who has played an especially prominent role in this activ-
ity, as a judge sitting in the far Pacific and as a member and chair of the
committee, is Alfred T. Goodwin.   From the beginning of his Ninth Cir-
cuit service, he heard cases appealed from Guam and the Northern Mari-
anas.  Starting when he was the circuit’s chief judge and continuing as
chairman of the Pacific Islands Committee, he went out to the islands
regularly; on one of his trips as chief judge, he helped dedicate the court-
house in Saipan.  As chief judge, he “had to cajole district judges” to go
1 See Stephen L. Wasby, A Look at the Smallest Circuit, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 417 (2010).
2 Before the change in the relationship between the United States and Panama, the District of
the Canal Zone was part of the Fifth Circuit.
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there and sent many judges from the Central District of California, “but
no one would go back,” so he assigned himself to go.3  After Judge
Goodwin assumed senior status, he continued his committee responsibil-
ity and often flew across the Pacific to sit in the courts of Guam and
other island locations.  In addition to sitting in those far-off courts, in
March 2004 he was in Guam with Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Mary
Schroeder and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor for a ceremony to mark
fifteen years of the Ninth Circuit’s certiorari jurisdiction over cases from
Guam and the change to Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction over those
cases.  His work in Guam and other south Pacific locations meant that he
continued to pack his large frame into an airplane when he was in his
80s, and he has observed, “It’s a grueling trip—11 hours by air—for
someone my age; I won’t sit in a fetal position for 11 hours, so I fly
business class.”4
Judge Goodwin sat in Guam as a trial judge,5 and, with U.S. district
judges from Guam and the NMI, as a member of the Appellate Division
of the District of Guam; some of the Ninth Circuit panels on which he sat
heard cases while in Saipan in the NMI.  He also came to sit by invitation
in other courts in the south Pacific—American Samoa, the Marshall Is-
lands, and the Federated States of Micronesia—where, as he put it, he
“wrote opinions for foreign nations,” or, as he put it more jocularly, “I’m
running my far-flung trap line.”6  Someone jokingly suggested the possi-
bility that he “went (somewhat) native,” fitting in well with the “locals,”
as when it was reported, “He was offered a bat for dinner, and he didn’t
even flinch; he ate the whole thing.”7  One cannot talk of federal judges
in the south Pacific without touching on the Pacific Islands Committee,
but the primary purpose of this Article is to provide a picture, using the
cases in which Judge Goodwin participated,8 of the types of legal matters
heard by the federal judiciary in Guam and in the cases the Ninth Circuit
3 Because he had sent others out there, he “thought I should go and see what was happening.”
Interview with Alfred T. Goodwin (Jan. 10, 1994).
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Order by Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., Assignment of a Judge to the District Court
of Guam, for April 11, 1996–April 10, 1997.
6 Conversation with Alfred T. Goodwin, (Jan. 6, 1994).
7 Memorandum from Judge William Canby to Associates [all other judges of the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals], forwarding an article, Islanders eating Pacific bats to extinction, ARIZ. RE-
PUBLIC, Sept. 2, 1993, and joking that Judge Goodwin was exacerbating this environmental problem.
He added, “It is my understanding that one eats these bats with the hair on, but our nameless miscre-
ant informed me that ‘it’s not really hair; it is more like fur.’” (n.d.) .
8 The Article is based on case dispositions, both published opinions and “unpublished” non-
precedential memorandum dispositions, along with Judge Goodwin’s correspondence about Pacific
Islands Committee work and related matters.  Unfortunately, the author was not able to undertake
any fieldwork in the locales in which Judge Goodwin sat, although he can claim to have watched
Ninth Circuit oral argument in Hawai’i.
3
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reviewed from Guam and the NMI, as well as to indicate the types of
appellate cases heard in several other island venues.  To be sure, many of
the cases that came before the judges visiting these far outposts were like
any others they encountered on the mainland—for example, routine ap-
peals from criminal convictions and sentences—but some of the cases,
whether heard out in the islands or on Ninth Circuit review, touched on
institutional or structural matters with which the committee was con-
cerned.  In particular, there were prominent cases concerning appellate
jurisdiction in cases from Guam and from the NMI, and some touched on
the basic relations between the United States and the territories as well as
on island politics, of which the mainland judges were appropriately wary.
With Ninth Circuit decisions part of this Article, there will be some de-
piction of the interactions of judges on that court’s panels as they decided
cases.
Once past an introductory description, the work of the Pacific Is-
lands Committee will not be discussed in detail but the committee ap-
pears with some frequency in this account because the judge’s service on
it is meshed with his sitting as a judge in Guam and NMI.  Membership
on the committee not only meant greater likelihood of sitting in those far-
off locations, particularly in the Appellate Division of the District Court
in Guam, but Ninth Circuit judges’ involvement in the courts of the south
Pacific has also been both judicial, as they sat as trial and appellate
judges there, and policy-making (if not legislative in the strict sense).
When in Guam or the NMI, the judges who were committee members
were not just “dropping in” to hear arguments and then go home, they
were also paying attention to the functioning of the local courts and the
views of members of the local bar with whom they would meet and dine.
Thus a recurring theme is that there was a crossover between, or mixing
of, judicial and policy-making roles.
A. HOW THE ARTICLE PROCEEDS
After a relatively brief look at the Pacific Islands Committee, the
focus of the Article turns to Judge Goodwin in Guam. Particular attention
is given to several years of the judge’s sittings there both as a trial judge
in the U. S. District Court and as a judge in its Appellate Division; Ninth
Circuit rulings on appeals from his decisions in Guam are included.  This
description, like the treatment of his sittings in other south Pacific ve-
nues, is rather detailed to allow the reader to see the full range of civil
and criminal matters, including domestic issues, in which the judge was
involved.  These matters were not unlike ones Judge Goodwin had seen
as a state and federal trial judge or those he faced during his nearly ten-
4
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year tenure on the Oregon Supreme Court, which like the Appellate Divi-
sion of the District of Guam was not a discretionary jurisdiction court at
the time.9  Following this description is treatment of cases from Guam in
which Judge Goodwin was a member of the Ninth Circuit panel; some of
those cases implicated important questions of jurisdiction. Attention then
moves to Ninth Circuit cases from the Northern Marianas, especially
those in which Judge Goodwin wrote opinions.  The judge’s involvement
in cases in other island republics ends this Article.
B. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS COMMITTEE
The Pacific Islands Committee, formerly the Pacific Territories
Committee, had its origins in 1975 in the work of the Ninth Circuit’s
then-Chief Judge Richard Chambers as he developed the Second South
Pacific Judicial Conference for the judges of the Pacific Trust Territo-
ries.10  After the conference, in 1976 Judge Chambers recommended to
Chief Justice Warren Burger that a committee be created to work with
the courts of the south Pacific, not limited to those venues with U.S.
territorial status.  The Chief Justice agreed with the recommendation and
appointed Judge Chambers to chair the Pacific Territories Committee of
the Judicial Conference of the United States (JCUS).11  The committee’s
purpose, as later stated, was “to act as a resource to the United States
territories and former Trust Territory of Pacific Islands in their endeavor
to make their judicial systems more effective and advance the rule of
law.”12  The committee’s work has been part of the “informal relations
between the now independent courts of Micronesia and the judiciary of
the Ninth Circuit,” continuing through today.13  Ever since Judge Cham-
bers, all the Ninth Circuit’s chief judges “have cooperated with the free
association states in furnishing judges as visitors to assist with
appeals.”14
Judge Chambers’ first committee report to the JCUS was submitted
on September 1, 1976, with a second report following in February 1977.
For the remainder of the decade, the committee, which met at the Ninth
Circuit’s Judicial Conference and sometimes at the judges’ mid-winter
9 Judge Goodwin has likened sitting on the Appellate Division of the District of Guam to
“being on the Oregon Court of Appeals,” with a “wide range of cases, including street crimes.” Like
the Appellate Division of the District of Guam, the Oregon Supreme Court was not a discretionary
jurisdiction court when Judge Goodwin sat on it. Interview with Alfred T. Goodwin, supra note 4.
10 The first such conference had been held in American Samoa in 1973.
11 Letter from Chief Justice Warren Burger to Richard Chambers (June 9, 1976).
12 Goodwin, supra note 1, at 125.
13 Id. at 113.
14 Id. at 114.
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meetings, “focused on reviewing and commenting on proposed legisla-
tion affecting the judicial structure of various island courts.”15  Among
the matters considered was an earlier idea to place the appellate jurisdic-
tion for all the Pacific territories in the District Court for Hawai’i, but
Judge Chambers, in a statement indicating the ethnic and cultural matters
to which the committee would regularly have to be sensitive, reported
that the idea was “strongly opposed” by those in the territories.  “Some
believe this is traceable,” he said, “to the unhappy relationships between
many American Samoan immigrants to Hawaii and many citizens of the
state of Hawaii.”16  Among the wide range of matters that the committee
was to consider over time was the possible creation of a Pacific Legal
Institute, continuing legal education in Guam, and assisting law libraries,
as well as a number of specific issues relating to Guam, and questions of
diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction for the territorial courts.
In addition to Judge Chambers, the committee’s initial members
were Ninth Circuit Judges Walter Ely of Los Angeles and Herbert Choy
of Hawaii, retired District of Guam judge Paul D. Schriver of Denver,
and former attorney general of American Samoa Charles H. Habernigg
of Portland, Oregon.  The committee’s composition changed in the 1980s
with Judge Chambers’ resignation from the committee in 1982 and Judge
Choy’s departure.  To replace Chambers as committee chair, Chief Jus-
tice Burger appointed then Judge Anthony Kennedy, perhaps as a “re-
ward” for getting his congressman, Rep. Harold “Bizz” Johnson, to
obtain funding for the new Ninth Circuit appellate courthouse in
Pasadena.17  In his 1985 report, Judge Kennedy suggested that with Con-
gress having approved basic structural matters concerning Guam and
NMI, the committee could shift more of its attention to American Samoa.
He also recommended against having attorneys as committee members18
and said that it sufficed to have three or four judges as the committee,
and the committee then became Ninth Circuit Judges Jerome Farris and
William Canby and District Judge Samuel King (D. Hawai’i).  In 1990,
now-Justice Kennedy reported to Chief Justice Rehnquist that the com-
mittee had completed its agenda and suggested discharging the commit-
tee.  The Chief Justice did so, but he turned over the committee’s work to
15 Alfred T. Goodwin, A History of the Pacific Islands Committee of the Judicial Council of
the Ninth Circuit 5 (unpublished manuscript) (n.d.).  The account here draws on that source as well
as the other material cited.
16 Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates re: People of Territory of Guam v.
Olsen, 540 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (June 8, 1976).
17 Email from Alfred T. Goodwin to Stephen L. Wasby (Feb. 6, 2014, 1:42PM ET) (on file
with author).
18 Mr. Habernigg had initially served with Judge Kennedy, along with Judge Ely and Judge
Leland Nielsen (S.D. Cal.).
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the Ninth Circuit’s Judicial Council.  On April 19, 1991, that body issued
the charter of the Council’s Pacific Territories Committee and shortly
thereafter, on August 4, 1991, changed its name to the Pacific Islands
Committee, a reflection of the changed status of some former Trust Ter-
ritories to independent republics.
Chief Judge Browning, who succeeded Chief Judge Chambers, had
not been interested in travel to the court’s far-flung outposts.  Judge
Goodwin became involved in the committee’s work after he became
Chief Judge and its work was, as just noted, transferred to the Ninth
Circuit.19  Judge Goodwin’s major involvement extended from the latter
part of his tenure as chief judge for quite some time thereafter, as both
committee chair and member.   Judge J. Clifford Wallace, upon becom-
ing chief judge, appointed Goodwin as committee chair for October 1,
1991, through September 30, 1995, which he extended by a year.20
When Goodwin joined the committee, in addition to Judges Canby and
King, its members were the district judges from Guam and the NMI,
John Unpingco and Alex Munson.21  Ninth Circuit judges who served on
the committee included Cynthia Holcomb Hall and Melvin Brunetti, the
committee’s chair in 1999, and the committee received assistance from
Ninth Circuit staff, particularly assistant circuit executive David
Pimentel.
Just before stepping down as chief judge, Judge Wallace became
chair of the committee; the new chief judge, Procter Hug, Jr., had not
wished to undertake the travel associated with the position.  Hug then
extended Goodwin’s membership on the committee a year at a time
through September 30, 1999,22 at which time Goodwin left the commit-
tee, but his absence was brief, as Chief Judge Mary Schroeder placed
him back on the committee when Judge Hall resigned, and then reap-
pointed him, at first for two years and then for an additional year.23
19 Judge Goodwin has suggested that his involvement came at the recommendation of former
Chief Judge Chambers, perhaps for Goodwin’s having moved to Pasadena as part of the court’s
obtaining the new courthouse there, see email from Alfred T. Goodwin to Stephen L. Wasby, (Feb.
6, 2014, 1:42PM ET) (on file with author), but the Ninth Circuit did not assume responsibility for the
committee until after Goodwin became chief judge.
20 Letters from J. Clifford Wallace to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 15, 1991 & Oct. 31, 1995).
Prior to appointing Goodwin as chair, Chief Judge Wallace, known for attention to administrative
detail, wrote to Goodwin about what he wished the committee to do and suggested an agenda. Letter
from J. Clifford Wallace to Alfred T. Goodwin (June 25, 1991).
21 Judge King was replaced, in turn, by fellow District of Hawai’i Judges Alan Kay, David
Ezra, and Susan Oki Mollway.
22 See, e.g., Letters from Procter Hug, Jr., to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 26, 1996 & May 11,
1998).
23 Letters from Mary Schroeder to Alfred T. Goodwin (Dec. 8, 2000, June 25, 2002 & Sept.
27, 2005).
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With Judge Wallace as its chair, the committee undertook a needs
assessment for judicial training, including a National Judicial College
study of whether the Supreme Court of Guam was sufficiently developed
to allow direct review of its rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court. How-
ever, that was only a small part of the wide range of matters in which the
committee was involved.  As to Guam and the NMI, issues considered
subsumed legislation, including changes in the Guam court structure
such as:
• The route for appeals from Guam and NMI to the Ninth Cir-
cuit—whether by appeal as of right or certiorari—and to the Su-
preme Court, Article III status for Guam and NMI district judges,
• The possibility of combining the Districts of Guam and NMI, a
continuing judicial vacancy (in Guam), the creation of a Com-
monwealth-Federal Council in NMI, possible interference with
investigations by a U.S. Attorney’s office, and
• Possible discipline for a judge who appeared to have encouraged
lawyers to contribute to a sports charity in which he was
involved.
While Guam and the NMI may have dominated the committee’s
work, also receiving attention were matters of wider coverage, which
included the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, Pelau, and American Samoa.  Some topics were “one-off.”
However, many topics recurred against the background of namely the
need to avoid involvement in local conflicts, particularly those between
judges and attorneys, to heed local preferences, and to be aware of the
tension between local self-determination and involvement by the federal
government, including the judiciary.  The topics the committee consid-
ered included the South Pacific Judicial Conference, including Ninth Cir-
cuit judges’ attendance, island judge attendance at Ninth Circuit judge
meetings, judicial education and training; potentially competing judicial
foundations or institutes,24 library facilities and holdings; law clerks’
travel expenses, court facilities in American Samoa, and assigning judges
to sit in the Federated States of Micronesia.
II. GUAM: COURT STRUCTURE AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION25
Some words are in order about the court structure in Guam and
about appellate jurisdiction over rulings in the island courts before Judge
Goodwin’s judicial service in Guam is examined.
24 The Pacific Legal Institute and Pacific Institute of Judicial Administration.
25 The sources referred to in note 1, supra, were the basis for this Part.
8
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The structure of the judiciary in Guam had been through a number
of transformations, some resulting from U.S. acquisition of Guam in the
Spanish-American War at the same time the U.S. acquired Puerto Rico,
and continuing throughout the century.  At first, the court structure that
had been established for Spain’s colonies was retained on an interim ba-
sis, but the Governor under the U.S. regime set up a Supreme Court of
four of his appointees.  In 1905, Congress converted this court to a Court
of Appeals of three judges (five for capital cases), and the Spanish Court
of First Instance became the Island Court.26  The Guam courts, which
used California law, were further reorganized in 1933, with the Court of
Appeals now having five judges appointed by the governor: a presiding
judge, two Navy personnel, and two Guamanians.  At the time of the
Organic Act of 1950, the Department of the Interior replaced the Navy as
the controlling U.S. agency. In 1951 the U.S. District Court was created
alongside the Island Court, and it was granted civil jurisdiction over
cases involving at least $2,000.  In 1974 the Island Court became the
Superior Court, with jurisdiction over all cases under Guam law.  Ap-
peals from the Island Court (and Superior Court) went to the Appellate
Division of the U.S. District Court, a district judge and two district
judges from other districts (a court of appeals judge could so sit), with
further appeal to the Ninth Circuit under a 1963 ruling.
A Supreme Court was also established in 1974. However, as dis-
cussed below, invalidation of transfer of appellate jurisdiction to that
court meant that there was no Supreme Court of Guam until one was
created in 1993 after Congress authorized it in the Omnibus Territories
Act in 1984; the judges were not sworn in until 1996.  The Supreme
Court consists of a Chief Judge and two full-time associate justices, with
up to four part-time associate justices; a Superior Court judge can be an
acting associate justice, as can a federal judge.  It has appellate jurisdic-
tion of cases under Guam law, including declaratory judgment requests
by the executive and legislature as to their powers.  Further appeal of
these Guam law cases was to be to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by
writ of certiorari,27 and then by certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Thus the Ninth Circuit retained judicial oversight of the Guam Supreme
Court’s actions; that lasted for 15 years, a span covering Judge Good-
win’s service on the Pacific Islands Committee, after which review of
decisions of the Guam Supreme Court would be by certiorari to the U.S.
26 This paragraph and that following are drawn from an unsigned, undated manuscript,
“Guam,” found in Judge Goodwin’s Pacific Territories Committee files.  One might assume that
Judge Goodwin was its author.
27 Similarly, cases from the Virgin Islands Supreme Court go to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit on certiorari. See In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 821 n.3 (3rd Cir. 2013).
9
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Supreme Court.  After all appeals filed prior to the establishment of the
Guam Supreme Court were heard, the District of Guam stopped hearing
appeals.28
A. GUAM APPELLATE JURISDICTION CHALLENGED
Early in Judge Goodwin’s tenure in the Ninth Circuit, he was in-
volved in that court’s grappling with the relation of Guam’s island courts
to the federal court system, a matter in which he was later to participate
while helping develop policy.  The initial effort to vest appellate jurisdic-
tion in a Supreme Court of Guam was challenged.  A case was appealed
from the newly created (or named) Superior Court to the Guam Supreme
Court, in which the Guam Territorial Legislature had vested appeals that
would have gone to the U.S. District Court’s Appellate Division as to
local non-federal matters.29  The respondent then asked the District Court
for a writ of prohibition precluding the Supreme Court of Guam from
acting on the appeal.  The Ninth Circuit thus faced the question of the
territorial legislature’s authority to shift this appellate jurisdiction and the
task of interpreting a sentence Judge James Carter, who wrote for himself
and Judge Goodwin, called “overstuffed” and Judge Anthony Kennedy
called “convoluted.”30 The Carter-Goodwin majority found that this
elimination of the District Court’s appellate jurisdiction had been author-
ized by Congress, and that the Guam legislature’s earlier and long-stand-
ing grant of appellate jurisdiction to the District of Guam was “not
compelled by the statute.”31 Judge Kennedy, in dissent, found no authori-
zation in the Guam Organic Act to transfer the District of Guam’s appel-
late jurisdiction and disagreed that the legislature’s power to “determine”
appellate jurisdiction allowed legislative extinction.  He thought, “Con-
gress would have spoken more directly had it intended to enable the terri-
torial legislature to substitute a local appellate court for the appellate
division of the district court.”32
It was to be only somewhat over two years before this ruling was
supplanted.  A defendant convicted in the Guam Superior Court tried to
appeal to the District of Guam, which dismissed the appeal.   The Ninth
Circuit took the case en banc before it was decided by a three-judge
28 See Goodwin, supra note 1, at 122–24.
29 Agana Bay Dev. Co. (H.K.) Ltd. v. Supreme Court of Guam (Dillingham Corp. of the
Pacific, Real Party in Interest), 529 F.2d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 1976) (Carter, J., for the majority),
overruled by Territory of Guam v. Olsen, 540 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 9176) (en banc) (per curiam),
aff’d, 431 U.S. 195 (1977); id. at 959 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 956 (Carter, J., for the majority).
31 Id. at 958.
32 Id. at 959 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10
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panel; this use of an en banc court before panel resolution of a case was
infrequently used but it was urged in this instance by several judges be-
cause of the number of people affected and, as Judge Richard Chambers
put it, “anarchy has been going on in the Guam court system.”33  In a
very brief per curiam opinion, the seven-judge majority adopted Judge
Kennedy’s earlier dissenting opinion: “We now hold that the provisions
of Guam’s Court Reorganization Act transferring the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the district court to a territorial court are not authorized by the
Organic Act.”34  Judge Goodwin, for himself and three other judges, dis-
sented on the basis of Judge Carter’s earlier opinion he had joined.  In
the course of voting on which of the prior opinions (Judge Carter’s or
Judge Kennedy’s) to adopt, Judge Shirley Hufstedler said she “would
like to keep the Supreme Court of Guam alive and fully stocked with
entirely local questions, excluding substantial federal questions,” but she
thought that would require rewriting either Guam’s Court Reorganization
Act or a portion of the Organic Act.35
Judge Chambers’ separate comments accompanying the en banc rul-
ing point to the mixed judicial-policy-administrative tasks of a Ninth Cir-
cuit judge who not only hears appeals from Guam and the NMI but who
also serves on the Pacific Islands Committee.  Chambers took no position
in the case because he had just been appointed by Chief Justice Burger to
chair the JCUS Committee on the Pacific Territories and he thought “I
should not wear a judicial hat and a semi-legislative or policy hat at the
same time, although I do not consider myself disqualified.”36  Other
Ninth Circuit judges, including Goodwin, were not to adopt that non-
participatory stance.
Before the Ninth Circuit had ruled on his appeal, the appellant tried
to obtain certiorari before judgment from the U.S. Supreme Court, which
denied the petition.37  However, on receiving the en banc decision, the
Justices affirmed but by only a 5-4 vote.38  For the Court, Justice Bren-
nan said that the 1950 Organic Act did not authorize divesting the Dis-
trict Court’s jurisdiction to hear appeals from Guam courts; there had
been no clear signal from Congress giving such authority to the territorial
legislature, which could “determine” jurisdiction only in selecting what
cases were appealable.  Dissenting, Justice Marshall thought the legisla-
33 Memorandum from Judge Richard Chambers to Associates re: People of the Territory of
Guam v. Olsen, 540 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (May 27, 1976).
34 Territory of Guam v. Olsen, 540 F.2d 1011, 1012 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam),
aff’d, 431 U.S. 195 (1977).
35 Judge Shirley Hufstedler, vote memo, People of Guam v. Olsen (June 20, 1976).
36 Memorandum from Judge Richard Chambers, supra note 34, at 1013.
37 Olsen v. Territory of Guam, 425 U.S. 960 (1976).
38 Territory of Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195 (1977).
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ture’s action was plainly authorized and called the abolition of the Guam
Supreme Court “unprecedented.”39
Some of Judge Goodwin’s judicial service in Guam while on the
Ninth Circuit was a result of a long-standing district court vacancy there
after Judge Cristobal Duenas retired.  The position was not filled during
the Reagan administration, with financial reasons contributing to the lack
of action.  Judge Goodwin remarked to Guam’s Delegate to Congress
about the “difficulty in finding qualified experienced lawyers who can
afford to take the job,” as the lawyers who were “most experienced and
most qualified” were “earning incomes well beyond the government sal-
ary”; that led him to suggest looking among younger lawyers for possible
appointees.40
Judge Goodwin’s early trips to sit in Guam let him see directly “how
important it is to have a judge who understands Guam, the people, their
language and customs,”41 and this led him to assist in recruitment.
Goodwin visited with a prospective nominee, John Unpingco, a native
Guamanian, at China Lake, California, where Unpingco was serving as
an Army JAG officer, and recommended him to the Ninth Circuit repre-
sentative on the ABA Standing Committee on the Judiciary.42  Yet once
Judge Unpingco was ultimately appointed, according to Judge Goodwin,
sometimes it was difficult to get judges to go to Guam to sit.  When there
were enough judges within the circuit who sought to go, determining
which judges should go was not always easy.  When the name of a dis-
trict judge from outside the circuit was suggested, there was negative
reaction, with a Ninth Circuit judge who was a member of the Pacific
Islands Committee stating that he “adamantly oppose[d] accommodating
requests like this from out-of-circuit judges.  There are many district
judges in our own circuit who would love to have an assignment in
Guam,” and arguing that they should be used first; he even suggested
that some would prefer the Guam assignment to attendance at the cir-
cuit’s judicial conference.43
39 Id. at 205 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40 Letter from Alfred T. Goodwin to Ben Garrido Blaz (Nov. 21, 1991).
41 Id. While indicating his willingness to sit in Guam “any time my schedule permits,” he said
“I believe Guam needs a full-time resident judge as soon as possible,” with “the condition . . .
urgent.”
42 Judge Goodwin says that the Guamanians “give him more credit than he deserves” for the
appointment, but he has been taken deep-sea fishing by Judge Unpingco’s brother (and not fed to the
fishes). Interview of Alfred T. Goodwin (Jan. 6, 1994).
43 Memorandum from A. Wallace Tashima to Mary Schroeder, John Unpingco, Alfred T.
Goodwin, J. Clifford Wallace, and staff (June 11, 2003); Memorandum from A. Wallace Tashima to
Alfred T. Goodwin & Mary Schroeder (Jan. 23, 2003).
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III. JUDGE GOODWIN IN GUAM
A. GOODWIN IN GUAM, 1994
The first years of Judge Goodwin’s service as a judge in Guam were
during the time when appeals from the Superior Court of Guam went to
the District of Guam’s Appellate Division.  What types of cases occupied
Judge Goodwin in Guam in his role as both a federal district judge and as
an appellate judge?  Although shortly after he took senior status in 1991,
he spent three weeks in Guam presiding over trials and serving on the
Appellate Division, two weeks in March 1994 are illustrative of the
range of cases that were typical of what he would see in his service there.
The first week was taken up with appellate work.   Prior to Judge Good-
win’s arrival, not only had a law clerk there provided a listing of the
appeals ready for that appellate session—not all of which appear to have
reached the final calendar—but Judge Unpingco had also proposed the
cases in which Goodwin would write the opinions.44
On the morning of March 8, Judge Goodwin sat with Judges Alex
Munson (D. NMI) and John Unpingco (D. Guam) to hear the appeals in
four criminal cases.  In one case, the issues included claims of outra-
geous government conduct violating due process, denial of effective as-
sistance of counsel (present in the other cases), and an error in
sentencing.45   Another case was a conviction for criminal sexual con-
duct.46 The third case, a conviction for burglary, robbery, and possession/
use of a deadly weapon in a felony, posed not only an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel issue but also issues on jury instructions (on “reasonable
doubt”), and a claim that the sentence constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.47  The last of the four cases involved official misconduct and
harassment issues as to whether the Guam statute on official misconduct
fit the charged conduct and on admission of testimony on prior bad
acts.48  Another case that did not make it to the calendar was a drug
conviction that would have required examination of the exercise of per-
emptory challenges of jurors in a manner not conforming to the territorial
statute, as well as the prosecutor’s including in closing argument factual
matters not in evidence.49
44 Letter from Jane Fearn-Zimmer (law clerk to Judge John Unpingco) to Alfred T. Goodwin
(Jan. 26, 1994).
45 Territory of Guam v. Ulloa, CR-91-00071A.
46 People v. Pitts, CR-91-00096A; People v. Scott, 91-00145A.
47 People v. Taimanglo, CR-93-00007A.
48 People v. Camacho, CR-93-00073A.
49 People v. Muna, CR-93-00034A; see letter from Jane Fearn-Zimmer to Alfred T. Goodwin
(Jan. 26, 1994), indicating “appeals ready for the March 1994 Appellate Session.”
13
Wasby: Trial, Appellate, and Committee Work in the South Pacific
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2015
206 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
Five more appeals, four criminal and one civil, were scheduled for
the next morning before the same panel.  An appeal from a conviction for
burglary and first-degree criminal sexual conduct involved sufficiency of
the evidence,50 and again denial of effective assistance of counsel was an
issue in two others.51  For a defendant convicted of multiple offenses,
including robbery, kidnapping, burglary, terrorizing, and using a deadly
weapon in a felony, sentencing issues were central—multiple sentences
for a single course of conduct and admissibility of prior bad acts.52  The
civil case involved the Superior Court’s sua sponte grant of summary
judgment and decree of specific performance, as well as a denial of a
motion to file an amended complaint.53
The next morning, the panel heard an appeal in a case involving
divorce and a property settlement agreement, where there were claims of
trial court error in defining “net profits” in a settlement agreement and in
the order for payment of a share of children’s college expenses even after
they were emancipated and did not begin college after high school.54
Then, when Judge Unpingco had to recuse himself, Judges Goodwin and
Munson were joined by Judge Lamorena from the Guam courts to hear
the inaptly captioned Darling v. Darling divorce and property settlement
appeal, with an issue of the payment of child support when the children
were in the custody of the party ordered to pay.55
On Friday, March 11, Judge Goodwin, as a trial judge, held a status
conference on a possible settlement of a suit for breach of an insurance
contract and lack of fair dealing with respect to the insurance,56 and he
also conducted a resentencing proceeding that resulted from an appellate
reversal of a sentence he had earlier imposed.   In 1992, on a conviction
for the defendant’s filling in federally protected wetlands on his own
property, the judge, who said during the sentencing that defendant “grew
up in a rice paddy in a place where the normal way of dealing with
politicians was giving them gifts,” sentenced the defendant to two
months of home detention, a $25,000 fine, and three years of probation,
reflecting a decrease in the Sentencing Guidelines level for acceptance of
responsibility, and declined to increase the Guidelines level for a re-
50 People v. Quezada, CR-93-00019A.
51 People v. Pitts, CR-91-00096A; People v. Carbullido, CR-93-00078A.
52 People v. Tedtaotao, CR-93-00001A.
53 Executive View Estate, Inc. v. Look, CV-93-00062A.
54 Johns v. Johns, CV-93-00060A.
55 Darling v. Darling, CV-93-00077A.
56 Cooney v. Continental Insurance Co., CV-93-00014.  Judge Goodwin took notes on legal-
sized lined pages, listing the claims of Plaintiff and Defendant and making some notes about “Law,”
but his records do not indicate a settlement.
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peated and continuous violation.57  That brought a negative response
from the Assistant United States Attorney, who claimed that defendant’s
not removing the fill despite repeated demands should be taken into ac-
count,58 and on the government’s appeal,59 the Ninth Circuit vacated the
sentence.  With no question that there had been a discharge of a pollu-
tant, Judges Otto Skopil and David Thompson said the Guidelines called
for a four-level increase if there were only a single discharge but a six-
level increase for a continuous and repeated violation, and they re-
manded for the sentencing judge to choose one or the other or to vary
from the Guidelines,60 while Judge Pamela Ann Rymer, concurring in
the judgment, thought the six-level increase was required.61
Judge Goodwin’s second week was spent serving as a trial judge.
On March 15, he held a status conference on a set of 35 land cases, while
the next day he had six matters, including a status conference in cham-
bers, a settlement conference, a motion for a preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order, and, on the criminal docket, a change of plea
and sentencing, a detention hearing (sealed), and an arraignment (also
sealed).  An arraignment (also sealed) took place the following day.  On
Friday, March 18, the judge, after beginning his day by conducting a
naturalization proceeding, continued with several criminal matters—a
change of plea, an initial appearance concerning a complaint, a sentenc-
ing, and a continued order to show cause—before dealing with a motion
for an interlocutory sale of a boat and a summary judgment motion in-
volving another vessel; he ended the day with a scheduling conference in
a civil case.  March 21 saw yet another settlement conference, a deten-
tion hearing, and a preliminary hearing.
1. Law Clerk Assistance62
In carrying out his work in Guam, what assistance did Judge Good-
win have? His notes indicate that his own elbow clerks were involved in
work on some Guam cases, and he also received assistance from a law
clerk to Judge Unpingco, with cases moved along through cross-oceanic
communication.  He preferred not to bring a clerk from the mainland,
because “[i]f I have a lottery to take a clerk, the others will be unhappy,”
57 United States v. Suarez, CR-92-00036.
58 Tambra A. Bryant, U.S. Attorney Upset with Sentence, PAC. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 1992, at
3.
59 In post-conviction proceedings, Judge A. Wallace Tashima (C.D. Cal.) denied relief on
defendant’s claims relating to the trial.  United States v. Suarez, 846 F. Supp. 892 (D. Guam 1994).
60 United States v. Suarez, 15 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table ruling).
61 Judge Goodwin’s files contain no indication of his action on resentencing.
62
 The communications cited in this section are on file with the author. See supra note 1.
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and he thought it better to take his secretary, “to help with getting cases
ready,” or a staff attorney “who has been a ‘nanny’” to the lawyers in
Guam.63
An example of assistance from a law clerk in Guam is a case that
was part of a situation in which three professors who stole personnel files
were fired and then reinstated by the Guam Civil Service Commission
(CSC) and the Superior Court dismissed the university’s appeal.  In the
process leading up to the Appellate Division’s affirmance of the dismis-
sal,64 the law clerk analyzed one of the matters at issue, the timeliness of
the filing of the appeal from the CSC.65  Responding to the law clerk,
Judge Goodwin dealt with the argument that the trial judge’s ruling was a
nullity because it was filed in the wrong court, which he thought an error
“in light of the liberal policy of Federal Rule Civ. P. 1” and an earlier
Appellate Division decision.66  He suggested matters on which he would
like to hear oral argument and indicated how he would decide the case
“[i]f we are free do so.”  Judge Goodwin admitted that the rule he pro-
posed was “all more or less legislative, but if Guam doesn’t want to take
care of business . . . ” He added, “Guam has never bothered to enact any
procedure for judicial review” . . . “somebody has to.  It is time to elimi-
nate this wasteful litigation over filing deadlines on petitions for judicial
review of administrative orders.”67
The law clerk in Guam continued to provide assistance when profes-
sors sued for civil rights violations on the claimed basis of discrimination
because of their origin as non-Pacific Islanders.68  After orders regarding
the scheduling of a hearing on a Motion to Quash Service and on other
procedural matters, the law clerk sent a bench memo recommending that
a Motion to Dismiss be granted as to some claims but not others, fol-
lowed by notifying the judge of the extensive Opposition filed by plain-
tiffs.69  The law clerk’s assistance extended to preparation of a draft
disposition, which she then “substantially modified” because of her re-
thinking of an immunity issue, where she found that qualified immunity
for individuals (to which she thought defendants were probably entitled)
63 Interview of Alfred T. Goodwin  (Jan. 6, 1994).
64 University of Guam v. Guam Civil Service Commission (Matheny, real party in interest),
Civil No. 94-00018A (order filed Feb. 10, 1995).  Judge Canby and Judge H. Russell Holland of the
District of Alaska served with Judge Goodwin on the Appellate Division in this case.
65 See Memorandum from Ann Keith to Alfred T. Goodwin (Jan. 4 1995).
66 The panel in that case was three district judges: Samuel King (D. Hawai’i), Alfredo Laureta
(D. N. Mar. I.), and Cristobal Duenas (D. Guam). A 1992 case implicated here was decided in 1992
by Judge Bailey Brown of the Sixth Circuit, Judge Terry Hatter (C.D. Cal.), and Judge Munson (D.
N. Mar. I.).
67 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Ann Keith (n.d.).
68 Matheny v. Torries, Civil No. 93-00074 (D. Guam).
69 Email from Ann Keith to Alfred T. Goodwin (May 11, 1974 & May 13, 1994).
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had not yet been put to the court.70  Judge Goodwin heavily edited the
draft order, particularly on the immunity matter, indicating that plain-
tiffs’ claims against defendants in their individual capacity could not be
examined prior to discovery and dismissing claims as to four defendants
unless, in his language, plaintiffs could “alleg[e] specific acts of discrim-
inatory behavior on the part of each named defendant as distinguished
from such generic vicarious fault as ‘failure to supervise’ other named
defendants,” and he ended by writing, “This is not a negligence case.”71
The effectiveness of the communication between Judge Goodwin in
Pasadena and the law clerk in Guam could also be seen in the judge’s
comment in a later case, “Keep me posted and I will keep you posted.”72
The judge first asked the law clerk to speak to the U.S. Attorney and the
Probation Department concerning a defendant’s request for in forma
pauperis status, and she reported that neither opposed the request while
also reporting the defendant’s motion for release pending appeal.73
Judge Goodwin then granted IFP status but denied bail, finding “no like-
lihood, even after an appeal, that Brooks [the defendant] would receive a
sentence of less than time served, including the normal time of an
appeal.”74
That case also serves to illustrate that Judge Goodwin’s membership
on the Ninth Circuit while handling cases in the islands could facilitate
resolution of problems.  When  appellant Brooks  wrote to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, declaring that he did not wish to have counsel on appeal, a motions
panel of Judges O’Scannlain, Leavy, and Kleinfeld, “pursuant to circuit
court policy, remand[ed] this matter to the district court for the limited
purpose of enabling that court to conduct a hearing pursuant to
Faretta.”75  The district court was to “engage in a colloquy with appel-
lant regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self representation on
appeal” and to make written findings.76  Receiving that Order, the Guam
law clerk wrote to Judge Goodwin to express concern about how to meet
the court’s requirement that the defendant “must personally appear to
waive his right to counsel,” given that Brooks was in  prison in Lompoc,
California.77  At this point, Judge Goodwin, taking responsibility for the
70 Email from Ann Keith to Alfred T. Goodwin (May 24, 1974).
71 The revised order was signed May 24, 1994.
72 Memorandum from ATG to Ann Keith re: United States v. Brooks, CR-98-00046 (Jan. 23,
1997).
73 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Ann Keith (Oct. 25, 1996); Memorandum from
Ann Keith to Alfred T. Goodwin (Oct. 28, 1996).
74 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Ann Keith (Oct. 28, 1996).
75 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
76 United States v. Brooks, No. 96-10478 (9th Cir. Filed Jan. 16, 1997).
77 Memorandum from Ann Keith to Alfred T. Goodwin (Jan. 24, 1997).
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sentencing “since Judge Unpingco did not feel comfortable sentencing a
local lawyer with whose family he is acquainted,”78 communicated
within his own court.  He wrote to the Clerk of Court that the motions
panel “may not have been aware that Mr. Brooks is currently serving his
sentence at Lompoc” and suggested that “it would be enormously time-
consuming as well as costly to the taxpayers to fly him to Guam so he
can tell the district court in Guam that he really understands the Faretta
case and wishes to be his own attorney,” particularly as Brooks had long
been a lawyer “and is well aware of his right to have an attorney.”
Goodwin suggested that federal marshals could bring Brooks from
Lompoc to Pasadena (where Goodwin had his chambers) for the Faretta
hearing, or to San Francisco, so Goodwin could conduct it and make the
necessary findings.79 Judge Leavy, as a panel member, suggested vacat-
ing the panel’s order and leaving the matter to Judge Goodwin, “in his
capacity as a judge of this court, for the purpose of reviewing by any
means he sees fit the question of whether Brooks is making a knowing,
intelligent, and unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel on appeal.”80
The other judges agreed and Judge Goodwin contacted a U.S. Marshal at
Lompoc to initiate a telephone call between the judge and Brooks;81 the
telephone call took place; and Judge Goodwin issued the necessary order
memorializing the phone call and concluding that Brooks had made “a
knowing, intelligent and unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel on
appeal.”82
B. GUAM, 1995
Judge Goodwin’s work in Guam is further illustrated by his week
there in January 1995 serving as a district judge.  On January 25, he held
settlement conferences in two cases and tried three cases concerning
land.   The Guam law clerk had indicated that several litigants had “re-
quested the opportunity to participate in a settlement conference before a
judge other than the trial judge,”83 so Goodwin held two more settlement
78 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Ann Keith (Jan. 23, 1997).
79 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Cathy Catterson (Clerk of Court, Ninth Circuit)
(Jan. 23, 1997).
80 Judge Edward Leavy to Judges Diarmuid O’Scannlain & Andrew Kleinfeld (Jan. 29,
1997).
81 Letter from Alfred T. Goodwin to Michael Southern (U.S. Marshal Service, Lompoc CA)
(Feb. 4 1997).
82 Order, February 6, 1997.
83 Memorandum from Jane Fearn-Zimmer to Alfred T. Goodwin (Jan. 4, 1995); ATG’s notes
on the face of the memorandum.
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conferences and accepted a change of plea.84  There was another settle-
ment conference on January 27, but two status hearings were struck from
the calendar and their place on the docket was taken by a guilty plea.
This service as a trial judge was followed by service on the Appel-
late Division with Judges Unpingco and Munson.  They decided four
cases on February 16, with Judge Goodwin writing the opinions in two.
While doing that work, he conducted additional settlement hearings, one
telephonically,85 and two others, one of which was continued from ear-
lier.86  Reviewing a Superior Court award of a default judgment and pu-
nitive damages in a purchaser’s suit for fraud and breach of contract,
Judge Goodwin wrote for the court to vacate the default judgment.  He
found an abuse of discretion in granting it without explanation after the
vendor showed a valid defense and he also ruled that the vendor’s alleg-
edly hiding to avoid service of process did not warrant punitive damages.
Not only had the court “been unable to locate anything in the record to
justify punitive damages,” but “[t]he defendant had no duty to run down
to the office of the plaintiff’s attorney to accept service of summons.  If
she was, in fact, hiding out to avoid service, the consequences of that
behavior are, inter alia, service by publication, not punitive damages.”87
Judge Goodwin also wrote to vacate a ruling by the same Superior
Court judge in a case an intoxicated pedestrian brought for injuries when
he was struck by a police officer’s (official) motorcycle.  The hapless
plaintiff, who had consumed beer, had been detained for reckless driving
but chose not to wait for a police ride home and instead started walk-
ing.88  The trial judge had found the police department 90 percent at fault
and awarded a judgment of $270,000 (after reduction for plaintiff’s 10
percent liability).  That award was excessive, Goodwin said, and while
there was “abundant evidence” of the officer’s negligence and of plain-
tiff’s contributory negligence, he found a lack of support for the 90 per-
cent ruling, referring to it as “the trial court’s curious decision that the
government of Guam was 90 per cent responsible for Lampley’s difficul-
ties,” as plaintiff “voluntarily placed himself in harm’s way” and “chose
the time and manner in which he slipped away from the police station to
wander about in the early morning darkness and traffic. . . .  No police
84 Matos v. M/V Chloe Z., CV-94-00013; Pranjic v. M/V Chloe Z., CV-94-00014; United
States v. Sy, CR-94-00147.   District Court of Guam, Calendar for the District Court of Guam for
January 26, 1995.
85 Howard v. Ambros, CV-94-00061.
86 The continued conference was in Lightning Development v. Consolidated Transportation
Services, CV-94-00066; the other case was Kallingal v. Director of Revenue and Taxation, CV-94-
00036.
87 Tokuda v. Huang, 882 F. Supp. 154, 156 (D. Guam App. Div. 1995).
88 Lampley v. Gov’t of Guam, 882 F. Supp. 957 (D. Guam App. Div. 1995).
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officer encouraged Lampley to jaywalk or linger in the street despite the
approach of an oncoming vehicle.”89  Nor could the panel find support
for future lost wages and the like but only “for such minor pain, cost, and
inconvenience as would be associated with removing metal pins and ap-
pliances that had been placed in his leg to assist healing.”90
Judge Goodwin also joined in his colleagues’ opinions.  In one case,
in which Judge Unpingco wrote the opinion, convictions for a string of
offenses (firearms, DUI, use of dangerous weapon in a felony) were af-
firmed.91 The defendant’s failure to raise the issue in a pre-trial motion
had waived objection to admission of a rifle found in his truck and the
defendant  also failed to establish that counsel’s not moving to suppress
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.92  Per Judge Munson, the
court also affirmed the Guam Worker’s Compensation Commission’s de-
nial of benefits to a former country club employee, affirmed by the Supe-
rior Court, as supported by substantial evidence,93 and dismissed, for
lack of prosecution, both a complaint and cross-claim in a case on te-
nants in common of real property.94 Also dismissed was an appeal from a
conviction for attempted theft and committing a felony while on felony
release after the defense attorney filed an Anders brief identifying speedy
trial as the only the possible issue.95 The court also, in a per curiam
disposition, found no error and affirmed in a suit to recover an unpaid
balance for the purchase of electrical supplies in which the trial court had
used one party’s findings.96
C. GUAM, 1996
Judge Goodwin’s service in Guam continued in 1996. This time he
sat on the district court’s Appellate Division. Again the judges heard a
series of typical cases.  For the appellate hearings on February 28 and 29,
they divided the opinions among themselves and filed them on March 5
and 6.  There were eight cases in addition to those in which Judge Good-
win wrote opinions.  One criminal appeal was from a conviction of a
man for sexual contact with his 14-year-old niece, in which the Appellate
Division ruled that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing
89 Id. at 958–59.
90 Id. at 958.
91 People  v. Garrido, 882 F. Supp. 152 (D. Guam App. Div. 1995).
92 Id.
93 Lopez v. Guerrero, 882 F. Supp. 952 (D. Guam App. Div. 1995).
94 Corbilla v. Villalada, DCA CV 94-00045A, Order (D. Guam App. Div. Feb. 16, 1995).
95 People v. Botelho, CR 95-0037A (D. Guam App. Div. 1995); see Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967).
96 Phoenix Eng’g & Supply, Inc. v. Universal Elec., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 956 (D. Guam App.
Div. 1995).
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol45/iss3/3
2015] Trial, Appellate, and Committee Work in the South Pacific 213
an offer to demonstrate that the claimed act was impossible, that the in-
dictment was specific, and that the evidence was sufficient.  In the other
appeal, from a conviction for murder and use of deadly weapon during a
felony, jury instruction and ineffective assistance of counsel claims were
rejected.97
Another case concerned an altercation in which defendant’s support-
ers pushed people working for Guam Cable News; those who had been
pushed sued and received summary judgment on First Amendment and
emotional distress claims.98  Without all present, the trial court had
adopted a judgment on other matters except for costs and fees, said the
omission was intentional, and refused to amend.  The appellate panel va-
cated that ruling as an abuse of discretion for not providing the appellants
the option of accepting the court’s conditions or otherwise proceeding.99
In a civil appeal with a question of timely filing, the appellate panel
affirmed dismissal for failure to prosecute the case and rejected as moot
the denial of an attorney’s withdrawal.100 The panel also cleaned up as-
pects of an employment dispute with claims and counterclaims of defa-
mation and interference with prospective business advantage. The
defendant had been represented by the Public Defender before becoming
ineligible for those services, but the trial judge had ordered the Public
Defender to continue.  The Appellate Division dismissed the request for
attorney fees and agreed Rule 11 sanctions were not warranted.101
In a land dispute over the width of an easement on which a project
was constructed, in which the trial court had determined the easement’s
width, granted defendants summary judgment, and denied reconsidera-
tion, the panel affirmed the trial court.102  In a case over an insurance
policy’s family-member exclusion resulting from a fatal automobile acci-
dent, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment to the insurance company and held that Guam law did not
make the driver, who had been adopted, part of the family.103  When a
97 People v. Muna, CR 94-00075A (D. Guam App Div., Mar. 6, 1996); People v. Sakura, CR
94-00131A (D. Guam App. Div., Mar. 6, 1996).
98 Kerrigan v. Gill, No. CV 95-00072A, 1996 WL 104517, at *5 (D. Guam App. Div. Mar. 6,
1996).
99 Id.
100 Farmer v. Slotnick, No. CV 95-00056A, CV 95-00073A, 1996 WL 104527, at *3 (D.
Guam App. Div., Mar. 5, 1996).
101 Moore v. Hoffman, No. CV 95-00033A, 1996 WL 104534, at *3 (D. Guam App. Div.,
Mar. 6, 1996).
102 Universe Resort Guam v. Sandcastle, Inc., No. CV95-00029A, 1996 WL 104525 (D.
Guam App. Div. Mar. 5, 1996), rev’d, 116 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished memorandum
disposition).
103 Costa v. Quidachay, No. CIV. 95-00108A, 1996 WL 104520, at *2  (D. Guam App. Div.
Mar. 6, 1996).
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person was injured in a building’s common space by a gun fired from
leased space used as a shooting gallery, the court considered the lessor’s
duty over the common space and affirmed summary judgment for the
lessors and others;104 the Ninth Circuit affirmed in turn, holding that the
owner had met its duty to inspect the premises.105
Prior to coming to Guam, Judge Goodwin had prepared an opinion
that was not used (he brought on disk proposed opinions in lieu of bench
memorandums).  As part of a larger dispute between Guam’s governor
and legislature as to who had the power over Guam’s Department of
Education, the Superior Court had issued mandamus to process employ-
ment papers.  The judges dismissed the appeal as not presenting a case or
controversy, although an appeal from a subsequent Guam Superior Court
ruling could produce an appeal on which there could be a ruling.106
In writing for the appellate panel, Judge Goodwin, in a straightfor-
ward ruling, affirmed a conviction for multiple criminal sexual contacts
involving the defendant’s eight-year-old stepdaughter.107  However, he
faced a somewhat more complex criminal appeal, this time from a con-
viction in a third trial for robbery and murder.108  The first trial had re-
sulted in a hung jury, the Ninth Circuit had reversed the second
conviction for improper jury instructions, and there had been a third con-
viction.  There was an apparent Brady violation relating to whether the
prosecutor should have produced a plea agreement with another individ-
ual,109 but Judge Goodwin found that the panel “need not decide that
issue” because, even were there a violation, reversal would not be re-
quired as there was no probability that, without it, the proceedings would
have produced a different result.  He also rejected the defendant’s claim
that speedy trial rights were violated by the extent of time from the Ninth
Circuit reversal to the reinstitution of proceedings. Looking at the factors
dictated by Barker v. Wingo,110 he found no error nor was there any error
as to jury instructions.111
One contract case related to a real estate lease agreement and option
to purchase, in which the Superior Court had given summary judgment,
104 Camacho v. Du Sung Corp., No. CV 95-00126A, 1996 WL 104528, at *3 (D. Guam App.
Div. Mar. 5, 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1997).
105 Camacho v. Du Sung Corp., 121 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1997).
106 See Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Judge John Unpingco re: Territorial Board
of Education v. Rivera, Special Proceedings Case SP 0024-96 (Oct. 10, 1996).
107 People v. Jonas, No. CR No. 94-00091A, 1996 WL 104530 (D. Guam App. Div. Mar. 6,
1996).
108 People v. Viloria, No. CRIM. 94-00132a, 1996 WL 104529 (D. Guam App. Div. Mar. 6,
1996).
109 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
110 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
111 Viloria, 1996 WL 104529.
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ordering specific performance.112  Judge Goodwin wrote to vacate that
requirement, affirm the trial court’s denial of motion to amend the com-
plaint, and remand “to 1) dismiss without prejudice the claim for dam-
ages and 2) direct that each party bear its own attorney fees and
costs.”113  Another contract case stemmed from disputes among compa-
nies involved in the construction of a large high-rise condo. The general
contractor, to supply “architectural, engineering, financing and construc-
tion services,” was to be paid from the condos’ sale.  One dispute was
over a provision, “[p]urportedly in the agreement,” allowing the general
contractor to “keep ownership” until its share of the costs was paid and
over the second company’s refusal “to issue any recordable document”
that would allow the general contractor “to perfect its security inter-
est.”114   On a claim for payment for labor and materials furnished for the
project by another construction company, the trial court had claimed lack
of jurisdiction to decide summary judgment; to obtain an appeal, the par-
ties stipulated that partial summary judgment was final.  Judge Good-
win’s opinion affirming in part and reversing in part found some grounds
for affirming summary judgment.  Although he said, “Ordinarily we
would not reach the trial court’s alternative statement of grounds for
granting summary judgment on the theory that it had no jurisdiction,” he
went on to discuss an unused mechanics lien remedy and counsel’s argu-
ments the trial court had apparently accepted, before ruling that
“[n]either assertion has any merit on the record in this case.”  Finding
that the plaintiff lacked any lien right when the present case was filed, he
made the side-comment that “any talk of a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy at law was mere cultural background in this case.”  He then up-
held summary judgment on some of plaintiff’s claims, with another
claim noted as still pending in the trial court.115
Judge Goodwin’s other opinion in this set of appeals involved an
effort to recover land allegedly lost through improper foreclosure
(though not a precursor of the U.S. housing debacle fifteen years later); a
Superior Court judge had dismissed the suit for relief.  In reversing and
remanding,116 Goodwin roundly criticized the plaintiff’s initial counsel.
112 Exec. View Estate, Inc. v. Kamminga, Civil No. 95-00125A, 1996 WL 104469 (D. Guam.
App. Div. Mar. 6, 1996).
113 Id.
114 This characterization of the case is drawn from Ann Keith, memorandum to ATG, Jan. 27,
1995, re: Brigham Construction and Development v. Lucky Development Co., T&K Development,
Civil No. 95-00051A, CV0078-92.
115 Brigham Constr. & Dev., Inc. v. Lucky Dev. Co., No. CIV. 95-00051A, CV0078-92, 1996
WL 104531 (D. Guam App. Div. Mar. 6, 1996).
116 And also finding certain other claims “premature on the record then before the court.”
Boggs v. C.Y.  Development, Civil No. 95-00084A (D. Guam App. Div., Mar. 5, 1996).
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Plaintiff’s initial pleading indicated a lack of interest in the property but
Goodwin ruled that, “[i]n view of the incompetence of plaintiffs’ original
counsel,” there was no such admission; instead it was clear from other
language in the complaint that plaintiffs “were trying to assert a right to
set aside a void lien foreclosure and reclaim their land.” Thus the court
“will not hold that they lost all legal and equitable rights to seek restitu-
tion or damages for the loss of the property, even though their lawyer
blundered.”117  In further criticism,118 he observed, “Much of the delay,
expense, and confusion in this case could have been spared if Boggs had
obtained competent legal counsel in the trial court [and] proceeded on an
intelligible legal theory . . . .”  He then spoke to the trial court: “Reasons
of judicial economy as well as of fairness to litigants commend very
cautious use of Rule 12 dismissals in cases in which it can be understood,
despite inept pleading, that a non-frivolous claim is being made, and . . .
some kind of relief possibly can be obtained.”
1. A Sidebar: Local Lawyering
Judge Goodwin’s criticism raised the matter of the competence of
lawyers in Guam, which was an issue across a number of cases. Com-
menting on the lawyering he had encountered, Judge Goodwin said that
it was certainly “not all bad.” While there were “refugees from discipline
committees in the States,” he found that some “seriously committed and
good lawyers” originally came to Guam in the Peace Corp or married
persons from Guam.  His view of the indigenous lawyers, however, was
that they were products of night law schools and not well prepared; most
were “nice people” but a couple were “more trouble than they are
worth.”119  He has also spoken of the number of Pacific Islanders who
had received their legal education at Santa Clara University in California.
One was Guam’s attorney general in the early 1990s, who told Goodwin
“that several Chamoro students went to Santa Clara and came back to
practice in Guam, where they are doing very well.”  Goodwin also noted
that the local population preferred local lawyers, because “[m]ainlanders
who go out there to live the good life and make a few bucks sometimes
aggravate latent unrest about colonialism.”120
Convicted defendants’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
certainly not uncommon but the lawyering in some cases did cause
117 Id.
118 Judge Goodwin was careful to exonerate plaintiffs’ present counsel: “We recognize that
Boggs’ present counsel did not represent Boggs when the Superior Court was dealing with the
complaint and the motions to dismiss.” Id.
119 Goodwin, supra note 4.
120 Letter from Alfred T. Goodwin to Jeanne E. Greenawalt (Dec. 20, 1991).
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problems.  One could see this most obviously in the show cause order
Judges Goodwin, Unpingco, and Munson issued in April 1993 to James
M. Maher relating to “the content and tone” of briefs “and for his com-
ments at oral argument.”121  The court referenced, among other matters,
Maher’s “repeated misrepresentations of the record” and “use of exag-
geration and hyperbole to distort the record,” his “repeated use of inflam-
matory, derogatory, and snide remarks” and “his calling into question the
integrity of the trial court” and the Appellate Division.  Evaluating
Maher’s 72-page response, the law clerk assisting him said the lawyer
“seems to intentionally miss the point of the panel’s concerns and spends
most of his time re-trying his appeal and maintaining that anything is
permissible in the defense of a criminal client.”122  The response’s tone
led the panel to conclude that a further hearing would be “neither neces-
sary nor appropriate,” and, treating its order as a public reprimand,
barred him from representing clients before the Appellate Division for
six months and ordered forfeiture of any Criminal Justice Act attorney
fees in the case.  The judges went further, chastising him by saying that
he “either does not recognize or chooses not to recognize the difference
between proper appellate argument and self-indulgent personal attacks
on his opponents” and pointing out that he “appeared to be at least as
interested in extended bouts of name-calling as he did in addressing the
legal issues he urged for his client.”123
In the south Pacific, substandard lawyering was not limited to
Guam, just as it is not limited to the Pacific islands.124  For example,
Judge Goodwin noted poor lawyering in a sodomy case he heard on the
High Court of Samoa; he said it had poor lawyers all over it.  When
asked if the quality was the same as it formerly was with Guam cases
(and about which he had earlier complained), the judge called the lawyer
community “the poor farm,” with a number of the lawyers there “a jump
ahead of the Grievance Committee”—an indication of why they had
relocated from the mainland.
Sitting in place of the recused Judge Munson, Judge Goodwin found
himself presiding over a judicial discipline panel in the Northern Mari-
anas with Judge Unpingco from Guam and Judge Sablan-Onerheim of
the NMI Superior Court.  An attorney—apparently well-known in the
local bar—was accused of a number of ethics violations based on his
121 People of the Territory of Guam v. Palomo, DCA No. 91-00061A; People of the Territory
of Guam v. Albertson, DCA No. 91-00062A (D. Guam App. Div., Apr. 8, 1993).
122 Memorandum from unnamed law clerk (but probably Ann Keith) to Alfred T. Goodwin
(May 12, 1993).
123 Order Imposing Sanctions (n.d.).
124 See Stephen L. Wasby, As Seen from Behind the Bench: Judges’ Comments on Lawyer
Competence, 38 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 47 (2014).
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having engineered a settlement in a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
case125 by having contacted plaintiffs without contacting their lawyer,
who filed a complaint and the CNMI bar took the matter further.  With
Judge Goodwin having worked with a local law clerk in preparing the
panel’s findings and orders, the judges agreed with the charges and or-
dered the attorney suspended for several months.126  He was also in con-
tact with Ninth Circuit colleagues on a panel handling an appeal in which
the attorney was to appear, to apprise them of the status of the discipli-
nary action,127 as there had been some concern in the disciplinary panel
that the lawyer would not reveal, as required, that he had been sanc-
tioned.  This was a further instance of what was seen in the Brooks case
that the judge’s Ninth Circuit service could assist in resolving matters in
the islands.
D. REVIEW BY THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Judge Goodwin’s Ninth Circuit colleagues were to review some of
his rulings in Guam, both from his sitting on the Appellate Division of
the District Court and as a trial judge.  As to the former, one case in
which he was affirmed concerned the Guam government’s rejection of an
individual’s attempt to register land, which the trial court found belonged
to Guam.  Writing for District Judge Munson and Superior Court Judge
Diaz, Judge Goodwin had cast the basic issue as whether the lot in ques-
tion “is in fact private land or whether . . . it is government land . . .
successively owned by Spain, the United States, and now the government
of Guam.”128 Recording land doesn’t entail ownership, he said, and an-
tiquity, use, and payment of taxes did not assist the claimant, as the gov-
ernment was not estopped from its land claim by having accepted his
taxes.129 The Ninth Circuit, while noting that both sides had colorable
claims of title, agreed as to estoppel and found that the claimant could
not establish adverse possession and had not proved good record title for
lack of documentary evidence as to the earliest grantor in the chain of
title.130
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed one of rulings where Goodwin had
sat as a district judge to accept a guilty plea and had sentenced defendant
125 Budanio v. Saipan Marine Tours (Civil No. 98-0062) (NMI).
126 Disciplinary Complaint Against Theodore R. Mitchell (Order filed May 4, 2001).
127 See, e.g., Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Judges Betty Fletcher, William Canby
& Richard Paez re: Budanio v. Saipan Marine, 99-16964 (Mar. 22, 2001).
128 In re Estate of Yamashita, Civ. No. CIV91–00081A, 1993 WL 128216, at *1 (D. Guam
App. Div. Apr. 8, 1993), aff’d, Yamashita v. Territory of Guam, 59 F.3d 114 (9th Cir. 1995).
129 Id. at *1–2.
130 Yamashita v. Territory of Guam, 59 F.3d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1995).
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to 235 months for conspiracy to import methamphetamine and heroin
and for attempted possession of those drugs.131  The ruling challenged on
appeal was his rejection of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.  In a non-precedential disposition, Judges Cynthia Hall, Melvin
Brunetti, and Sidney Thomas affirmed, saying, “The record belies [the]
assertion” that defendant believed he had an absolute right to withdraw
his plea, and Judge Goodwin had not abused his discretion in denying the
motion.132
While affirming in some instances, the court of appeals also reversed
the Appellate Division on which Judge Goodwin had sat. In one exam-
ple, Judges Goodwin, Duenas, and Munson affirmed a conviction for
aggravated assault and possession/use of a deadly weapon during a fel-
ony.  Making no mention of the ruling below, a Ninth Circuit panel held
that all jury instructions must be read aloud to the jury with counsel and
defendant present, so the trial judge’s refusal to instruct orally on ele-
ments of the charged offense required automatic reversal.133  A different
Ninth Circuit panel (Judges Reinhardt, Norris, and James Browning) also
reversed a conviction for conspiracy to distribute marijuana.134  Agreeing
that a customs agent who allowed a marijuana shipment through for a
$20,000 payment could be found responsible for the whole smuggling
operation entailing several distributions, the panel nevertheless reversed
as to a rental car agent who, for one ounce of marijuana, provided a car
used to move a shipment.135 Several years later, Judges Reinhardt, Ed-
ward Leavy and Sidney Thomas reversed the Appellate Division as to a
conviction on several counts of criminal sexual conduct involving chil-
dren, assault, and child abuse, because testimony concerning the contents
of sexually explicit adult gay magazines were irrelevant to the charges
and its admission was reversible error.136
E. GUAM, 1998
Further evidence of the work of a mainland judge deciding cases in
Guam came when Judge Goodwin returned for the week of April 20-24,
1998, to perform service both as a district judge and on an appellate
panel.  On the first day, he dealt with three ex parte applications to order
the transfer of funds and to accept a stipulation for extension of time to
131 United States v. Ascura, 134 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1988) (unpublished table disposition)
(superseding 124 F.3d 213 (9th Cir. 1987)).
132 Id.
133 Territory of Guam v. Marquez, 963 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1992).
134 United States v. Umagat, 998 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1993).
135 Id.
136 People of the Territory of Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998).
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complete a land transfer.137 The next day began with a status confer-
ence138 and two settlement conferences, at least one of which was suc-
cessful, reflected in a letter from an assistant attorney general indicating
acceptance of the taxpayer’s settlement offer, which needed to be re-
flected in a judgment.139 Then came various criminal matters: an initial
appearance combined with a show cause order about revocation of pre-
trial release conditions;140 two initial appearances with waiver of indict-
ment, filing of information, and taking of a plea;141 and an appearance
concerning an indictment.142  There was also a sentencing, ten months
for distributing methamphetamine, in which the judge recommended that
defendant serve his sentence at the Federal Correction Institution at Dub-
lin, California.143  However, the Bureau of Prisons, reporting that FCI
Dublin “house[d] only sentenced female offenders,” found that “it has
been necessary to designate Mr. Yamanaka to the Federal Prison Camp
(FPC), Nellis Air Force Base, Las Vegas, Nevada, which is commensu-
rate with his security needs.”144
A party was a “no show” for an April 21 hearing on a default judg-
ment,145 one of three settlement conferences scheduled for April 22 was
cancelled, and another went “off” the calendar.146 The next day, after the
judge held a scheduling conference,147 the appellate panel heard a motion
to dismiss and suppress evidence and a Brady motion in a case for tax
evasion because of unreported miscellaneous income, discussed further
immediately below.148  Judge Goodwin ended his day with “two more
137 Government of Guam v. 6,390.56 Sq. Meters of Land and Amistad, CV-66-0038; Govern-
ment of Guam v. 4,225.81 Sq. Meters of Land, in Municipality of Agama, and Guzman, CV-69-
00130  and Government of Guam v. 4,966.20 Sq. Meters of Land, in Municipality of Agana, and
Tanaka .
138 United States v. Guam Power Authority, CV-97-00030.
139 Letter from Stephen A. Cohen (Assistant Attorney General, General Counsel, Department
of Revenue and Taxation) to Alfred T. Goodwin (as Settlement Conference Judge) Leong v. Direc-
tor, Department of Revenue and Taxation, CV No. 96-00092 (Apr. 21, 1998).  The other settlement
conference was in Ranon v. Micronesia Assistance, Inc., CV-97-00078.
140 United States v. Woods, CR-98-00034.
141 United States v. Crisostomo; United States v. Sablan.
142 United States v. Sealed, CR-98-00062.
143 United States v. Yamanaka, CR-98-00006 (D. Guam, 1998).
144 United States v. Yamanaka, CR-98-00006 (D. Guam, 1998); Letter from Peter M. Carlson
(Regional Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons) to Alfred T. Goodwin (June 18 1998).
145 Fajardo v. Korean Development Corp. (Seoul Regency Hotel), CV-98-00002.
146 Respectively, Caterpillar Financial Service Corp. v. Mariza Z/Laura Z/Margaret Z, CV-
95-00063/ CV-95-00064/CV 95-00106; Grzuno v. Don Juan Fishing Co., CV-97-00056.  The case
in which the settlement conference was held was United States for Catalasan v. Somera Construction
Co., CV-97-00016.
147 Fargo Pacific Inc. v. P.W.S. International, CV-98-00005.
148 Government of Guam v. Taitano, CR-98-00010.
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arraignments.”149 On April 24, the judge handed down two sentences,
held a final pretrial conference, and, in a bankruptcy case, dealt with an
application for an order to authorize a trustee to sell property and pay
advertising costs.150
Less than two weeks after Judge Goodwin presided over the tax eva-
sion case, Judge Unpingco’s law clerk sent a proposed order denying the
Motion to Dismiss or Suppress Evidence,151 which Goodwin signed the
same day.  The defendant had argued that a government agency’s release
of Form 1099s, which led to the prosecution, was improper, but the Or-
der found no violation of the Internal Revenue Code and Goodwin said
that, in any event, the proper remedy would not be to suppress evidence
or dismiss an indictment.152  He found that the Department of Revenue
and Taxation was “permitted to turn over taxpayer return information to
its prosecutorial arm” (a division in the Attorney General’s Office), and
how the tax officials received the information about the failure to report
was “not material.”  He dismissed “defendant’s expressed outrage” be-
cause the Department of Education had to file the Form 1099s and he
would not hold a Form 1099 to be “return information” not supposed to
be released to others, “because to do so would be to reward the . . .
Department of Education for failing to comply with its legal duty to file
the 1099 with Revenue and Taxation.”153
At its April 23 session, the Appellate Division (Goodwin-Unpingco-
Munson) dealt with two cases, in one affirming a trial court default judg-
ment entered for noncompliance with discovery where the party had been
warned,154 and in the other affirming in a Munson opinion a conviction
for aggravated murder and conspiracy to commit it, with special allega-
tions.  Judge Goodwin had raised a question about prosecutorial miscon-
duct, which had taken the form of calling an attorney representing a
cooperating witness to get him to vouch for “state of mind,” the sort of
behavior Goodwin wanted stopped in the Guam courts: “[W]ith the
bench and bar in the shape they are in at this time it is a wrong message
to send to the judges of the Supreme Court that vouching in this form is
acceptable, even though it was not objected to at trial.”  He therefore
149 Alfred T. Goodwin notation on calendar.
150 Respectively, United States v. Bamba, CR-97-00173; United States v. Lam, CR-97-00185,
Lingao-Lingao v. Bitanga, CV-96-00080; In re Walkinshaw, BC-97-00096.
151 Memorandum from Ann Keith to Alfred T. Goodwin re: People v. Taitano, CR-98-00010
(May 4, 1998).
152 Finding that “no authority has been cited for holding that suppression or dismissal is an
appropriate remedy for the violation,” he added, “Defendant has presented no valid reason for pun-
ishing the government by suppressing evidence in a criminal case.” People v. Taitano, CR-98-00010,
Order (D. Guam, May 4, 1998).
153 Id.
154 Lee v. Cha, CV-96-0030A (D. Guam App. Div. 1998).
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urged modifying the opinion so that instead of saying vouching had not
occurred, it would say that vouching had occurred but was harmless er-
ror.  He made clear that if his two colleagues did not agree, “I will sim-
ply convert my suggestion into a specially concurring opinion on the
ground that the error was harmless,”155 but Judge Munson agreed,156 ob-
viating the separate concurrence.
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW OF GUAM CASES
Beyond appeals from Judge Goodwin’s Guam district court rulings,
there were many other cases from Guam the Ninth Circuit reviewed, and
throughout the judge’s long Ninth Circuit tenure, he participated in many
appeals brought from there and from the Northern Marianas.  Some, but
relatively few, of those appeals were actually heard in Hagatna, Guam,
and in Saipan, Northern Marianas.   Ninth Circuit panels sitting in the
islands most often were composed of three circuit judges, although at
times two circuit judges were joined by a mainland district judge.  As a
convenience to island lawyers by reducing their travel time, most appeals
were heard on the court’s annual Honolulu calendar instead of at San
Francisco, where the remainder were heard.
A. A DEFECTIVE PANEL
Before examining Ninth Circuit cases in which Judge Goodwin par-
ticipated that resulted in published opinions, which are circuit precedent,
and those with unpublished non-precedential dispositions, requiring at-
tention are cases in which the court’s authority was questioned because
of the panel’s composition.  A panel that was fatal to the court’s author-
ity was composed of two Ninth Circuit judges—Goodwin and Mary
Schroeder—and a district judge, but not one from the mainland or
Hawai’i.  The problem was that the district judge was a territorial, non-
lifetime judge—interesting in that the Pacific Islands Committee had
considered a proposal to shift the judges from Guam and the Northern
Marianas to Article III (lifetime) status.
Two cases posed the immediate problem.  The first was a straight-
forward criminal appeal from Guam, argued there with Judge Alex Mun-
son (D. NMI) as the third member of the panel, in which defendants
appealed their methamphetamine convictions.157  The panel affirmed,
155 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Judges Munson & Unpingco re: People v.
Demapan, CR-95-00009A (May 7, 1998).
156 Memorandum from Judge Alex Munson to Alfred T. Goodwin & Judge Unpingco (May 8,
1998).
157 United States v. Nguyen, 284 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 69 (2003).
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finding the evidence sufficient and ruling that evidence tying defendants’
brother and nephews to defendants was not irrelevant or improperly prej-
udicial.158  Such a case would probably have been decided as a non-
precedential memorandum disposition, but Judge Schroeder spoke of
“the presumption in favor of publication in Guam and NMI cases”159 that
was probably part of the effort to build up the corpus of law in the terri-
tories.  The other case, argued in the NMI two days after the first, with
Judge John Unpingco (D. Guam) as the third judge,160 was a Title IX
sexual harassment claim against a college and its officials in which the
college had won a summary judgment and a jury returned a verdict
against an instructor.  Speaking through Judge Goodwin, the panel af-
firmed, ruling that the college was not deliberately indifferent to the sex-
ual harassment, so recovery under Title IX was precluded.161
However, that was far from the end of the matter.  The losing parties
sought Supreme Court review, and the criminal defendants, who had not
raised the issue in the court of appeals, now claimed that a district judge
from a territory, not being a judge appointed “during good behavior,”
could not properly sit on a U.S. court of appeals panel.  The panel had
been aware of the problem but had decided to proceed.  During prepara-
tion for the sitting, Judge Goodwin had communicated with Judge
Schroeder and the Clerk of Court about the district judges’ eligibility to
sit.  He found them to be “district judges within the circuit” and sug-
gested proceeding. However, he noted that, “under the present regime in
Washington, there is a 50-50 chance that a panel with an Article I judge
on it could be challenged as not properly authorized,” but he would “let
some busybody challenge the decisions if they want to.  It would get the
matter before the Supreme Court maybe,”162 which was indeed to hap-
pen.  The Clerk of Court, who said she had “made the mistake of asking
the AO,” which did not “think Article I judges could sit on Article III
courts,” nonetheless said, “I say go for it.”163
The Administrative Office was to be proved correct.  Speaking for
the Supreme Court about what he called the “highly unusual presence” of
the territorial judges, Justice Stevens, for the five-Justice majority which
reversed the conviction, ruled that the statute allowing district judges to
158 Id.
159 Memorandum from Judge Mary Schroeder to panel re: United States v. Nguyen, 284 F.3d
1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (Feb. 22, 2002).
160 Oden v. N. Marianas Coll., 284 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 924 (2003).
161 Id.
162 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Mary Schroeder & Cathy Catterson (Nov. 20,
2001).
163 Memorandum from Cathy Catterson to Mary Schroeder & Alfred T. Goodwin (Dec. 3,
2001).
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sit required that they be Article III judges and that the territorial judges,
Article I judges who held term, not lifetime, appointments, were not so
qualified.164  Nor would the majority accept the validity of the convic-
tions on a variety of other grounds.  For example, two judges of a panel
were a quorum that could transact business or at least complete a panel’s
work, but Justice Stevens said the statute required that a panel had to be
composed ab initio of three judges, and the panel had to be a properly
constituted set of three judges, which this panel was not.  The dissenters
disagreed as to whether the presence of a judge not properly on the panel
could be excused.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the defendant had
failed to object to the presence of the district judge and that presence
“simply did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputa-
tion of judicial proceedings.”165
Then in the case from NMI, the Court granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment, and remanded (GVR’d) for reconsideration in light of its pri-
mary ruling.166  On remand, a completely different panel—Judges Susan
Graber, Melvin Brunetti, and Jay Bybee—again found no deliberate in-
difference and thus no Title IX violation.  However, as to a consolidated
appeal from the plaintiff’s separate territorial case, the panel said that the
court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from the Supreme
Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in cases
that, like this one, were not completed before a statute providing for a
limited period of court of appeals review expired.167
The criminal case’s subsequent history was somewhat different and
indicates that a different panel can produce a different outcome.  Here
the new panel—Judges Jerome Farris, John Noonan, and Johnnie Rawl-
inson—affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded in a non-prece-
dential memorandum disposition.  They again found that introduction of
evidence on familial relations was proper and that evidence was suffi-
cient to support the convictions, but they ruled that drugs passing through
international airspace from California to Guam did not constitute “impor-
tation” and thus convictions for conspiracy to import and for aiding and
abetting had to be reversed, with the case remanded for resentencing on
the remaining count of attempting to possess.168  In a superseding dispo-
sition, the panel also found that in sentencing, the district court had im-
properly adopted the pre-sentence report’s statement of the quantity of
164 Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 73 (2003).
165 Id. at 84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
166 Oden v. N. Marianas Coll., 539 U.S. 924 (2003).
167 Oden v. N. Marianas Coll., 440 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2006).
168 United States v. Nguyen, 103 F. App’x 635 (9th Cir. 2004), withdrawn, 113 F. App’x 252
(9th Cir. 2004).
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drugs, which was error under the Supreme Court’s cases requiring jury,
not judge, findings of facts.169
The panels the Supreme Court found defective had heard several
other cases, but those judgments apparently remained undisturbed as the
losing parties did not seek certiorari.  On February 14, 2002, the Good-
win-Schroeder-Unpingco panel had heard three other civil appeals at Sai-
pan.   One involved a preliminary injunction sought to bar the transfer of
assets outside the Northern Marianas, to protect rights under a settlement
agreement related to a debt for commercial goods, which the district
court had denied for lack of a showing of irreparable harm.  The Ninth
Circuit panel affirmed on ruling that the district court could not grant
such an injunction to an unsecured creditor.170  Another appeal, which
raised questions as to a defendant’s failure to object to the form of a
verdict, arose when a developmentally handicapped person, from whom
a police officer had illegally obtained a confession (and the prosecution
had then dismissed the case), sued the officer and had received only $1 in
general damages but $10,000 in punitive damages.  As Judge Goodwin’s
opinion explained, the verdict form given the jury—with no objections to
it or the instructions at any one of several points, thus waiving chal-
lenges—“produced a confusing array of answers to a list of incompre-
hensible interrogatories,” and “True to the reputation of special
interrogatories in tort cases as the darling of the insurance industry, the
verdict form created more legal questions than the pleadings and evi-
dence had presented.”171 As to “the only issue,”  “whether the evidence
supports the verdict,”172 Goodwin found that “[t]he jury obviously be-
lieved the evidence that the defendant had used improper means in ob-
taining the confession, and believed that the plaintiff had been denied
advice that he could have a lawyer if he asked for one.”173  In the third
case, the panel, in a brief non-precedential disposition, found no disputed
questions of material fact and thus upheld a summary judgment granted
defendants in a suit by a former corrections department director for em-
ployment discrimination involving pay differentials and retaliation.174
169 United States v. Nguyen, 113 F. App’x 252 (9th Cir. 2004). The applicable cases were
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
170 Dateline Exps. v. Basic Constr., 306 F.3d 912 (2002) (per curiam). Judge Schroeder was
the author of the per curiam opinion.
171 Ayuyu v. Tagabuel, 284 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 2002).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1027.
174 San Nicolas v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, N. Mariana Islands, 31 F. App’x 496 (9th Cir. 2002).
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B. PUBLISHED OPINIONS
In appeals from Guam, among the Ninth Circuit’s published opin-
ions, which create circuit precedent, the politically most sensitive were
an inter-branch dispute, an elections case, and two cases on courts’ juris-
diction—an aggravated murder case which turned on whether the panel
still had jurisdiction to decide the case, sensitive because of the implica-
tions for local courts’ authority, and one on the allocation of import quo-
tas, where the question was whether the general federal courts had
jurisdiction.  These were decided along with more mundane cases in-
volving land and construction.
The inter-branch dispute, containing some elements of intrigue, oc-
curred when Guam’s legislature passed a bill but then recessed without
providing for receiving messages during the recess.  The governor re-
ceived the bill (from whom?)175 during the recess, and he sent a message
“to someone connected with the legislature”176 that he couldn’t return the
bill.  That prompted a senator to sue and District Judge Duenas upheld
the governor’s (non)action; however, after his ruling, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit said the President could return a bill to Congress during
an intra-session recess if a mechanism for receiving it was in place.177
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the D.C. case, saying that Guam legisla-
ture failed to make that sort of provision and holding that “the district
court correctly concluded that the Governor was free to take advantage
of the legislative hiatus and exercise the pocket veto.”178
The elections case was of a type seen on the mainland when the
major political parties created obstacles for third parties or independent
candidates, and Judge Goodwin drew on a Supreme Court case that re-
sulted from Ohio’s efforts to block George Wallace from appearing on
the ballot.179  In Guam, the ballot had candidates for 21 legislative seats
with one Democrat and one Republican candidate for each seat.  Some-
one had been barred from the 1974 legislative primary ballot under a rule
that those who signed petitions for independent candidates could not
have signed petitions for party candidates.  The district court found that
the rule did not create an equal protection violation, but Judges Goodwin,
Stanley Barnes, and John Kilkenny thought otherwise and vacated and
remanded with instructions.  While the Supreme Court had recognized a
state interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot, Judge
175 Bordallo v. Camacho, 520 F.2d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (“The record is
provocatively silent on the manner of delivery and the identity of the messenger.”).
176 Id. (“again the record is tantalizingly silent”).
177 Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
178 Bordallo, 520 F.2d at 765.
179 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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Goodwin said the Guam rule had not been shown to have that purpose,
which instead was “to make it more difficult for an independent candi-
date than for a party candidate to obtain valid signatures,” so the law’s
“net effect is a severe restriction on the rights of voters and independent
candidates.”180
The earlier-noted ongoing changes in Guam court structure included
changes in the routes for appeals, and a case illustrates a judge’s deciding
the applicability of a statute with which the Pacific Islands Committee
was involved.  The Guam Supreme Court affirmed a Guam Superior
Court conviction for aggravated murder and, as was then permissible,
further appeal was by petition for certiorari to the Ninth Circuit, which
granted the petition and heard argument in the case at Saipan on April
30, 2004.
The panel’s initial discussion was about a Miranda issue going to
the validity of the conviction.181  Then on October 30, 2004, six months
after argument, Congress struck the provision that had given the Ninth
Circuit certiorari jurisdiction over Guam appeals; however, no provision
was made for pending cases like the murder conviction.  Faced with this
situation, the panel (Judges Goodwin, Schroeder, and Wallace) sought
supplementary briefing, and discussion turned to the question of the
court’s jurisdiction.182  There was much shifting of position within the
panel,183 particularly as to what case controlled the opinion—the Su-
preme Court’s Landgraf decision on statutory retroactivity184 or the Civil
War era McCardle ruling on withdrawal of jurisdiction.185  Also at play
were the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bruner v. United States,186 a rela-
tively recent case involving district court appellate jurisdiction in cases
from the island courts of NMI focusing on the Tucker Act in which it had
been held that jurisdiction continued,187 and the quite-recent Ninth Cir-
cuit Duldulao ruling, which barred consideration of a petition pending
180 Webster v. Mesa, 521 F.2d 442, 444 (9th Cir. 1975).
181 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
182 Indicating the interplay of judicial Pacific Islands Committee matters, Judge Schroeder
wrote, “On a related subject, is the Committee following up on why the AO did not notify us [about
the statutory change]?” She also asked, “On another related subject, what is happening with the
district court vacancy in Guam?”  She added a concern about the viability of Guam government,
saying she wanted to talk to someone “about what this means for the hoped for future of a corrup-
tion-free government in Guam.” Memorandum from Mary Schroeder to panel re: Santos v. The
People of The Territory of Guam, 436 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (Dec. 24, 2004).
183 In particular by Judge Goodwin: “To the charge of waffling, I plead guilty.” Memorandum
from Alfred T. Goodwin to panel re: Santos (Dec. 2, 2005).
184 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
185 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
186 Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952).
187 Gioda v. Saipan Stevedoring Co., 855 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1988). Judge Goodwin criticized
the basis for that ruling and saw no need to extend it.
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when the statute withdrawing jurisdiction was enacted.188  Ultimately,
the judges, drawing primarily on Bruner, held that the Ninth Circuit no
longer had the authority to decide the appeal.  As Judge Goodwin wrote
for himself and Judge Schroeder, “The withdrawal of our power to hear
the case carried with it the destruction of our power to decide the
case.”189  Judge Wallace used a somewhat different route, focusing on
McCardle and Duldulao,190 to reach the same result.  Apart from what
the ruling said about appellate jurisdiction affecting the territories, the
case illustrates both Ninth Circuit case processing and judges’ sensitivity
to island issues.  Before the panel’s discussion turned to jurisdiction, one
of the judges called attention to the publicity the murder case had re-
ceived in Guam,191 but, even more so when the question arose as to
whether the Ninth Circuit could continue to review the Guam Supreme
Court’s ruling, there was awareness of Guam lawyers’ sensitivity on the
matter.  In discussing hearing argument on the jurisdictional question,
Judge Wallace observed, “Because of the political sensitivity of Guam to
this issue, a video conference might be preferable” (to teleconference), so
the attorneys could be heard;192 a month later, he added, “My main con-
cern was with the sensitivity on this issue in Guam, and whether it might
not be prudent to hear from the lawyers.”193  Also of concern was reac-
tion by the Guam judges, particularly if the panel were to rule on the
merits and criticize the police.  As Judge Goodwin put it, “The Guam
Supreme Court would not appreciate our laboring over the complex
twists and turns of the Miranda performance of the local police and then
holding that the police and the Superior Court erred, and that the Su-
preme Court also erred in part, but that the errors were all harmless”;194
that discussion would be obviated if the Ninth Circuit declared it lacked
jurisdiction to resolve the appeal.
Another aspect of sensitivity to island issues was the way matters on
Guam were treated in relation to similar matters involving the NMI.  Al-
though these territories are independent entities, each with its own ena-
bling legislation, and each is a separate federal judicial district, the
judges nonetheless are very careful in taking actions with respect to one
that could seem inconsonant with those taken with respect to the other.
188 Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996).
189 Santos v. People of the Territory of Guam, 436 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006).
190
“Duldulao is replete with language that controls this appeal.” Id. at 1055 (Wallace, J.,
concurring separately).
191 Memorandum from Mary Schroeder to panel (Apr. 30, 2004) (“The case was highly publi-
cized in Guam.”).
192 Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to panel (Dec. 9, 2004).
193 Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to panel (Jan. 3, 2005).
194 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to panel (July 7, 2005).
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That arose in connection with the jurisdictional question in Santos be-
cause at roughly the same time, the Oden case (discussed above) had the
same issue.  The need for the Santos panel to keep the Oden case in mind
can be seen from a Judge Goodwin note that it would be awkward if the
cases came out differently “even though the two statutes and their legis-
lative history vary slightly” and in what he wrote in a subsequent note,
“Even though the legislative histories and the actual language of the two
enactments vary to some degree, the distinction is probably too subtle to
impress the lawyers of the two most interested bar associations.”  He
went on to say that if the panels considering the two cases “cannot be
brought together on the point, the two opinions should be carefully writ-
ten to explain why they differ in the result, then filed simultaneously, so
our readers will know the disagreement is not an accident.”195  However,
the judge’s suggestion for coordination was rejected and the panel pro-
ceeded with its opinion, with Oden to follow.  The Santos case also had
the potential to affect cases pending before other panels, which were de-
ferring decision in their cases until Santos came down.196  Thus, Judge
Goodwin wrote to some judges to indicate that the jurisdictional issue
was still under study and there would be no decision in Santos by the
Hawai’i calendar, which contained cases from Guam subject to the same
jurisdictional problem.
Another type of jurisdictional issue arose in relation to the special
economic arrangements U.S. territories had with the “mother country,”
including terms under which items manufactured in those territories
could be brought into the United States.  A statute on the importation of
watches from Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands197 was
intended to aid products made in the labor-intensive watch manufactory
in the islands without harming the domestic watch industry, and alloca-
tion of quotas under the statute led to a suit in the District of Guam by
watch manufacturers against the Secretaries of the Interior and Com-
merce.  The district court dismissed the case on the basis that its subject
matter properly placed the case in the Customs Court.  Judges Goodwin,
Joseph Sneed, and J. Blaine Anderson, affirming per curiam, said that
“the 1979 Allocation Rules have a substantial relation to traditional cus-
toms purposes, i.e., protection of domestic industry from foreign compe-
tition and the raising of revenues, even though the rules also have the
concurrent purpose of promoting insular economic development.”  Fur-
195 Alfred T. Goodwin, note on face of bench memo from Judge Wallace’s chambers (Dec.
29, 2004); Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to panel (Dec. 30, 2004).
196 See also John Noonan, memorandum to Santos panel, Nov. 17, 2005 (indicating that he
had a case from the May 2004 Hawai’i calendar about Guam tax assessments, with the decision
deferred for Santos.).
197 19 U.S.C.A. § 1202 (Westlaw 2015).
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thermore, the plaintiff watch manufacturers could obtain access to the
Customs Court by choosing to import in excess of the quotas.198
Among the appellate cases in which Judge Goodwin participated
that resulted in published opinions was a criminal case for murder of two
Navy enlisted men.  One of two possible defendants could not be prose-
cuted under Guam criminal law and the other was convicted at a trial
before Judge Duenas under the felony murder doctrine. A challenge to
the use of that doctrine was rejected by the Ninth Circuit panel of Judges
Goodwin, Barnes, and Kilkenny, with Judge Kilkenny concurring sepa-
rately on the belief that the unqualified felony murder instruction should
not have been given.199
Three criminal appeals argued on February 14, 2003, at Saipan
before Judges Goodwin, Mary Schroeder, and A. Wallace Tashima are
indicative of Guam criminal cases without any particular “Guam flavor,”
that is, issues specific to the island.  The panel affirmed a conviction for
perjury and making of a false statement in an asylum application, ruling
that the statements were material.200  The judges also affirmed the dis-
trict court’s refusal to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea to narcotics
trafficking. They found that the plea colloquy, with someone competent
in English, was thorough and that too much time had elapsed between
the plea and the motion to allow the defendant to withdraw it.201  How-
ever, they did reverse a conviction for conspiracy to distribute meth be-
cause District Judge Unpingco had exceeded his authority in ordering
immediate deportation as a condition of supervised release instead of
turning the convicted defendant over to the immigration authorities for
deportation proceedings; here the panel agreed with other circuits.202
Two other published opinions dealt with contract questions relating
to land or building on it.  Judge Duenas had denied specific performance
concerning a land sale on the basis that the buyer’s option was not prop-
erly exercised.  The panel (Judges Goodwin and Eugene Wright and
Judge Howard Markey of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) in-
stead held in a four-paragraph per curiam opinion that the option has
been properly exercised when a bilateral purchase/sale contract was sub-
stituted for a unilateral option contract.  It was, they said, a local law
matter whether the buyer’s action complied with contractual obligations,
so they vacated and remanded for a decision “free from any misconcep-
198 Jerlian Watch Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 597 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
199 Territory of Guam v. Root, 524 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1975).
200 United States v. Chen, 324 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2003).
201 United States v. Nostratis, 321 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2003).
202 United States v. Tinoso, 327 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003).
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tions about the validity of the exercise of the option.”203 In the other
case, involving construction at Anderson AFB, the general contractor
had not paid a supplier of concrete for driveways, who sued under the
Miller Act.  As Judge Harry Pregerson stated for the panel (also Judges
Goodwin and Donald Lay of the Eighth Circuit) in affirming Judge Unp-
ingco’s judgment for the supplier, that statute was “enacted to protect
suppliers of materials and labor for federal projects.”204
C. “UNPUBLISHED” DISPOSITIONS
In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, over 80 percent of the court’s
dispositions are non-precedential memorandum dispositions, often re-
ferred to as “unpublished” dispositions because of their origin in that
status.205  Quite a number of the Guam appeals in which Judge Goodwin
participated resulted in such non-precedential rulings.  Included were a
number dealing with procedure, some relating to land, a divorce, and
several criminal cases.  In most cases, the judges were inclined to affirm
the district court, an attitude perhaps best seen in a very brief 1973 dispo-
sition, which read in its entirety: “This court certainly ought not to re-
verse a judgment where a Guamanian statute, applied literally by the
local district judge, is sensible and the material facts are not disputed.”206
Most cases, particularly the criminal appeals, were like cases from else-
where, that is, they were not sui generis because of their Guam origin.
However, one divorce case among those heard—involving an Air Force
general who had been in Guam on duty but maintained a Florida domi-
cile—did raise the question of whether U.S. military personnel could
avail themselves of Guam’s “policy of opening its courts to service per-
sonnel,” with the judges (Goodwin, Koelsch, and Wallace) deciding that
the “[t]raditional view of Domicile has to yield” to Guam’s policy.207
As was true with published opinions, some non-precedential disposi-
tions turned on jurisdiction.  When the district court had dismissed a suit
to quiet title, the Ninth Circuit panel reversed and remanded, saying that
prior to the Guam Court Reorganization Act of 1974 and the court’s rul-
203 Sgambelluri v. Velarde, 511 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).  Internal panel commu-
nication about the case concerned citing an unpublished disposition which was then redesignated for
publication.
204 United States ex rel. Hawaiian Rock Prods. v. A.E. Lopez Enters., 74 F.3d 972 (9th Cir.
1996).
205 See Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the
Process, 14 S.  CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (2004).
206 Hassler & Crain v. Stanfoam, No. 72-2774 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 1973) (Koelsch, J., for the
panel).
207 Alfred T. Goodwin, conference notes (Jan. 15, 1974); Lewis v. Lewis, 73-2474 (9th Cir.
Jan. 31, 1974).
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ing in Look v. Government of Guam,208 the District of Guam did have
subject-matter jurisdiction over such cases.209 Furthermore, when the
Appellate Division of the District of Guam had dismissed an appeal from
the Island Probate Court, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, as the ultimate
rights in the case could be resolved in the Guam courts.  The statute
allowed the Appellate Division’s Presiding Judge, sitting as a single
judge, to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,210 and the Ninth Circuit panel
of Judge Goodwin and Judges Chambers and Wallace upheld the dismis-
sal on the grounds that the judge had acted within his powers.211
In a case stemming from a contract and indemnity agreement, fol-
lowed by an arbitration award and a payment demand, the trial judge
entered a default judgment as a sanction for not appearing at a deposi-
tion, and the Appellate Division remanded on finding abuse of discretion
in the entry of the default as a discovery sanction.  The Ninth Circuit
panel (Goodwin, Thomas Nelson, and Charles Wiggins) found the case
simple,212 requiring only a three-line order to affirm for the district
court’s reason.213 A Ninth Circuit panel also overturned a dismissal for
want of prosecution six months and 13 days after the case was filed, as it
appeared that the district judge’s pique had played a part.  Noting that
“[t]he record reveals that the trial judge became exasperated because the
conduct of an attorney for the plaintiff appeared to be wanting in can-
dor,” the panel thought the dismissal “unduly punishes the client for col-
lateral errors of his attorney” —who, the court noted, “is no longer
practicing in Guam” —and other sanctions were available.214
With land ownership important in the islands, it is not surprising that
some appeals involved land issues.  One came in a landowner action for
encroachment.  Judges Barnes, Kilkenny, and Goodwin affirmed plain-
tiff’s lack of standing to complain about non-continuous trespass prior to
possession, but they reversed the dismissal of the case, as the record was
not clear that the entire claim was covered and dismissal would have to
cover its full scope.215 The same judges also handled an appeal from a
ruling that another family had land by adverse possession.  Here one
208 Look v. Gov’t of Guam, 497 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1974).
209 Guam United Trading Serv. v. Bamba, No. 74-1198 (9th Cir. June 20, 1975).
210 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424(a) (Westlaw 2015).
211 In re Estate of Lujan/Smith v. Lujan, No. 73-2695 (9th Cir. July 18, 1974).
212 See Alfred T. Goodwin, conference memo re: Fargo Pacific v. Imamura, 166 F.3d 1217
(9th Cir. 1998) (Nov. 3 1998) (table) (“The judges were in agreement this was probably a one-off
case with no further cases to come.”).
213 A law clerk’s bench memorandum raised questions of “finality” of pre-trial decisions by
the Appellate Division.  Memorandum from law clerk (Larry) to Alfred T. Goodwin (Oct. 27, 1998).
However, the panel did not follow that route.
214 Gaspard v. Fritzen, No. 74-1707 (9th Cir. n.d.).
215 Yu Co. v. Olsen & Olsen, No. 74-2126 (9th Cir. July 8, 1975).
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could see that, in reviewing Guam cases, the U.S. court of appeals at
times had to deal with island court proceedings that were more informal
than was optimal.  It could be seen that the dispute was at least in part a
family matter in Judge Goodwin’s conference notes, which stated that
that “Kilkenny is a little doubtful that adverse possession can run against
relations who in practice are using the land in common.”216  The panel
was particularly frustrated by inadequate findings.  The “contradictory
and sketchy record on appeal” did not provide facts for a final judgment
on which the judges could rely although “[t]he local judge may have had
knowledge of facts that did not become part of the record.”  Judge Good-
win was careful to say, “We have no reason to question the trial court’s
resolution of credibility issues, but the case requires a proper set of find-
ings, informed by, and relevant to, the appropriate substantive law.”217
Moreover, the trial court’s finding as to who paid the taxes was contra-
dicted by the evidence.  The panel thus vacated and remanded “for such
further proceedings in the appropriate court [whether the District Court
or the Island Court as may be needed to establish a proper factual
record.”218
The many standard criminal appeals from Guam dealt with a variety
of issues; questions of searches and sentencing arose in quite a number of
them.  In addition, the court (here, Judges Rymer, Goodwin, and Sandra
Ikuta) reversed a post-verdict judgment of acquittal after a conviction for
making a false statement to immigration officials, because District Judge
Tydinco-Gatewood had substituted her own judgment for that of the jury,
and vacated and remanded for reinstatement of the jury verdict.219 The
same panel, finding ample evidence of participation, affirmed a convic-
tion for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.220 When the district
court in Guam221 denied withdrawal of a plea, the Ninth Circuit panel
(Judges Goodwin, Rymer, and Raymond Fisher) dismissed the appeal
because of the defendant’s valid waiver of appeal as part of the plea.222
There was also a suit against prison officials for an inmate’s death, dis-
missed by the district court on the basis of a two-year statute of limita-
tions.  The panel, for which Judge Goodwin wrote, reversed the
216 Alfred T. Goodwin, conference notes re: Reyes v. Taitano, 538 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1976)
(table) (May 23, 1975).
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 United States v. Ling, 283 F. App’x 565, 566 (9th Cir. 2008).
220 United States v. Elm, 283 F. App’x 554 (9th Cir. 2008).  The district judge was Judge
John Coughenour of the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation in Guam.
221 Here, Judge Robert Jones of the District of Oregon.
222 United States v. Alado, 210 F. App’x 710 (9th Cir. 2006).
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dismissal223 after waiting for another Ninth Circuit case,224 which found
a three-year limit for cases prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wilson
v. Garcia that § 1983 cases were personal injury actions for limits
purposes.225
Searches were under review in a drug case, with a search under exi-
gency upheld and the district court finding of consent not clearly errone-
ous,226 and in a case of a drug user in possession of a gun and
ammunition, affirmed on one of the bases the district court had used to
sustain the search.227  There were also search issues in a standard multi-
issue criminal appeal in a drug and firearms case in which the panel
(Judges Schroeder, Goodwin, and Richard Clifton) found no error in the
district court’s admission of testimony or its refusal to suppress the re-
sults of a search of a home, found the stop of a car proper, and found the
evidence sufficient to support a conspiracy, but found the record inade-
quate to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which
would have to await collateral attack.228  There was also a counterfeiting
investigation in which evidence had been suppressed.   After some inter-
nal communication about whether the U.S. Attorney had properly certi-
fied the case for interlocutory appeal, a matter resolved after learning of
some problems in the office of Clerk of Court, the Wiggins-Thomas Nel-
son-Goodwin panel agreed that the government had failed to serve de-
fendants with copies of the warrants.229
The sentencing appeals were varied.  A standard appeal with no ref-
erence to Guam was a challenge to a sentence after a guilty plea in a
methamphetamine case, in which the panel found the government had
not breached the plea agreement and the district court had not erred in
not giving a downward departure, nor was there error on the amount of
drugs attributed to the defendant.230 When the district judge231 denied
continuance of sentencing to give counsel time to move to withdraw a
guilty plea, the Goodwin-Rymer-Fisher panel upheld that decision, as the
district court had adequately balanced Sixth Amendment rights with de-
lay and inconvenience.232
223 Blas v. Gov’t of Guam, 851 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1988) (table).
224 Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 858 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988), also from Guam.
225 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
226 United States v. Alaimalo, 166 F.3d 344 (9th Cir. 1998) (table).
227 United States v. Santos, 63 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2003); Judge Goodwin wrote for a
panel including Judges Pamela Rymer and Thomas Nelson.
228 United States v. Dela Pena, 62 F. App’x 754 (9th Cir. 2003).
229 United States v. Choi, 185 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1999) (table).
230 United States v. Zabala, 165 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1998) (table) (Judges Wiggins, Thomas
Nelson, & Goodwin).
231 Judge Roger Benitez of the Western District of Washington.
232 United States v. Lujan, 211 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Another appeal involved the intersection of proper sentencing and
deportation.  The defendant had pled guilty to possessing counterfeit and
unauthorized access devices,233 but there was no allocution at the sen-
tencing.  Judges Goodwin, Wallace, and Stephen Trott affirmed because
the defendant had been deported and thus was no longer able to be pre-
sent for allocution, but their action was subject to an appearance for re-
sentencing if defendant were to be back in the country.234 And when a
district judge235 denied defendant’s motion to force the government to
file a motion for a downward departure for substantial assistance, a
Goodwin-Reinhardt-Carlos Bea panel vacated and remanded on finding
the government’s refusal arbitrary.236
V. NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW OF NMI CASES
Under the Covenant reached with the U.S. government in 1977,237
the Northern Marianas became a federal judicial district; the Islands’
trustee status was terminated a decade later in 1986.  Even before hearing
cases from the U.S. District of the Northern Marianas, the Ninth Circuit
had to deal with a question of governmental authority in the prior Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands.  In the case, Micronesian citizens sued in
U.S. district court in Hawai’i to block the High Commissioner’s action
approving lease of land for the building of a hotel.  The district court
dismissed the case on finding that, while U.S. environmental laws ap-
plied to federal agencies operating in the Trust Territories, the territorial
government’s action was not subject to Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) review.  The appeal turned on whether the island citizens had a
remedy in the island courts, without which they would be without re-
course.  As Judge Goodwin’s law clerk put, they would lack a remedy, if
the Commissioner—appointed by the Secretary of the Interior (as were
the members of the island High Court) —“can hide behind an order of
the Secretary, which is not reviewable in the island court.”238
The Ninth Circuit (Judges Goodwin and Ozell Trask and Senior Dis-
trict Judge William East [D. Or.]) affirmed the dismissal.  Goodwin, for
himself and Judge East, agreed that while the Trust Territory was not a
U.S. territory or possession under the APA as the United States was trus-
233 Before Judge James Otero of the Central District of California.
234 United States v. Kim, 305 F. App’x 427 (9th Cir. 2008).
235 Robert Takasugi of the Central District of California.
236 United States v. Marquez, 198 F. App’x 678 (9th Cir. 2006).
237 48 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (Westlaw 2015).
238 Memorandum from Donald Friedman (law clerk to Judge Goodwin) to Alfred T. Goodwin
re People of Saipan v. U.S. Department of Interior and Continental Airlines, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir.
1974) (Jan. 31, 1974).
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tee for the United Nations, the Trust Territory was like the entities in-
tended to be excluded from APA review.  However, unlike the district
court, Goodwin did find that the islanders had judicially enforceable sub-
stantive rights deriving from the Trusteeship Agreement.  While these
rights were “not initially enforceable in United States courts, [r]ather,
upon principles of comity, they should be asserted before the High Court
of the Trust Territory.”239 In the end, he was careful to allow re-filing in
the U.S. district court if the High Court of the Trust Territory were to
find itself without jurisdiction to review the High Commissioner’s action.
Judge Trask reached the same result but in a somewhat different manner:
the Trusteeship Agreement itself was not self-executing, but subsequent
actions had made it judicially enforceable and the provisions of the Trust
Territory Code led him to agree that the case should be heard first in the
High Court.
A. JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
Before the NMI had its own appellate court, the U.S. District Court,
through its Appellate Division, had appellate jurisdiction over cases from
the NMI courts as the NMI government had provided, with federal ques-
tions reserved to the federal court.240 The Commonwealth Judicial Reor-
ganization Act of 1989241 gave the Supreme Court of the NMI
jurisdiction over all appeals from the island’s trial court—now the Com-
monwealth Superior Court—and transferred pending cases to the new
Supreme Court.  With this change, appeals were to go to the Ninth Cir-
cuit only after a final ruling from the CNMI Supreme Court, so the U.S.
District Court’s jurisdiction over appeals was eliminated.  The Ninth Cir-
cuit had to deal with a controversy that arose from this alteration of ap-
pellate jurisdiction.  The resulting Wabol and Mafnas cases were almost
as important, if not more so, for the time necessary for the Ninth Circuit
to resolve them than for their important rulings. It is clear that the court
of appeals’ internal processes negatively affected its relationships with
CNMI, and this NMI history was also to affect similar jurisdictional is-
sues as to Guam.  Judge Goodwin did not participate in either case but
was involved tangentially as the circuit’s Chief Judge and then as chair
of the Pacific Islands Committee.
Wabol v. Villacrusis began as a land claim dispute. On that point the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the NMI provision restricting long-term aliena-
tion of interests in Commonwealth land was not subject to Fourteenth
239 People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
240 48 U.S.C. § 1694b(a) (current version at 48 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (Westlaw 2015)).
241 P.L. 6-25, § 3106.
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Amendment equal protection limitations.242  The importance of the case
stems instead from whether the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction to hear the
case was removed by the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands
Judicial Reorganization Act of 1989.  That law was enacted while the
appeal was pending before the Ninth Circuit, “almost one year after this
appeal had been fully briefed, argued and submitted for jurisdiction.”243
That might lead one to ask why the panel had not been able to file its
opinion within a year’s time—instead of closer to two years after argu-
ment (argument May 11, 1988, opinion filed February 20, 1990).  The
answer may be that the author, Judge Cecil Poole, was notoriously slow
in producing opinions.  Whatever the reason, as Judge Goodwin was
later to observe, “We had trouble with Saipan because the question
[about cases in the pipeline when the new NMI Supreme Court was oper-
ating] was not resolved by statute and the panel that got the question for
our court to decide lost about two years’ time and substantial amount of
good will for our court in failing to decide the case when the question
urgently needed to be decided.”244
The case had first been before a Ninth Circuit motions panel, which
issued a show cause order as to whether the case should be dismissed for
lack of a final judgment and sent the case to a merits panel for considera-
tion of that question, which resulted from the district court’s having re-
manded the case to the island trial court.  The merits panel (Judges
Charles Wiggins and Melvin Brunetti with Judge Poole) found “suffi-
cient characteristics of finality . . . to command our immediate attention”
and the proceedings pending below would not preclude resolution of the
central question.245  The panel stated that some accounting matters might
remain “should not prevent our adjudication of important and potential
dispositive questions which have been fully briefed and argued,” and do-
ing otherwise would “disserve the cause of judicial economy and there-
fore frustrate the very purpose of the final judgment rule.”246
The finality matter was, however, only a predicate to the more im-
portant jurisdictional issue.  In the Court Reorganization Act, the Com-
monwealth had removed federal court jurisdiction over appeals from the
local trial courts, including those pending when the Act was passed, and
242 Wabol v. Villacrusis, 898 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1990), as amended, 908 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.
1990), as amended, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990) .
243 Id. at 1386.
244 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to J. Clifford Wallace and others (June 19, 1991).
Judge Goodwin, in commenting later on the Mafnas case (see below) referred to the “equally infa-
mous” Wabol case, “infamous for the delay and the apparent confusion.” Memorandum from Alfred
T. Goodwin to Pacific Islands Committee (Jan. 24, 1994).
245 Wabol, 898 F.2d at 1385.
246 Id. at 1386.
45
Wasby: Trial, Appellate, and Committee Work in the South Pacific
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2015
238 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
the new NMI Supreme Court had upheld that provision.247  However, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that it did retain jurisdiction because the Covenant
creating the NMI’s governmental structure “does . . . limit NMI’s author-
ity to restrict the jurisdiction of courts empowered to hear appeals from
federal courts or involving issues of federal law,” and Congress, in its
1984 amendments to the Covenant, had made clear that NMI “would not
have the authority to determine which courts would be empowered to
hear appeals from federal courts.”248 Thus, what NMI had done was “an
exercise of precisely the kind of authority Congress has withheld from
NMI.” NMI officials could not “amend or circumvent the express provi-
sion that all appeals from the appellate division of the district court must
be heard by [the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals], without limitation.”249
The Mafnas case was, like Wabol, a land dispute.  It was tied to
local ethnicity involving claims that a land transfer violated provisions
limiting the ability of those not of NMI descent to obtain permanent or
long-term interests in land, but it also became tangled in the Common-
wealth Judicial Reorganization Act’s withdrawal of federal appellate ju-
risdiction.  It also seemed to go on interminably, part of the time
attributable to deferral of submission in February 1989 pending the
Wabol decision, which itself, as just seen, was not to come soon.  Once
Wabol did come down in early 1990, the first panel to consider Mafnas
(Judges Wallace, David Thompson, and Ferdinand Fernandez) dismissed
the appeal because the Judicial Reorganization Act had deprived the Dis-
trict Court’s Appellate Division of jurisdiction over appeals in which
there was no final mandate.250  Then the District Court’s Appellate Divi-
sion said that the Mafnas I dismissal meant that its ruling stood, but the
NMI Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition to the Superior Court to
disregard the Appellate Division’s mandate.  The appeal of that ruling
became the first case to reach the argument stage on direct appeal from
the Commonwealth Supreme Court.  In this second iteration of Mafnas, a
panel of Judges Warren Ferguson (who wrote), Mary Schroeder, and
Betty Fletcher first observed, “The procedural background to this case is
confusing due to what appears to be a race between the parties to find a
court that will hold in their favor,”251 but the judges ruled that Mafnas I
had removed the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction.  Appellate jurisdic-
tion in the Ninth Circuit existed but the case was moot, the same result
achieved by vacating the Appellate Division mandate.
247 Wabol v. Villacrusis, #89-005 (Supreme Court, Northern Mariana Islands, Dec. 11, 1989).
248 Wabol, 898 F.2d at 1387.
249 Id. at 1388.
250 Mafnas v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Mariana Islands, 919 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1990).
251 Mafnas v. Superior Ct. of N. Mariana Islands, 936 F.2d 1068, 1069 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Judge Ferguson made an accurate prediction when he observed that
once the NMI Supreme Court decided matters, “any issues which remain
in dispute will find their way back to this court,”252 but another set of
Ninth Circuit judges—William Norris, Robert Beezer, and Andrew
Kleinfeld—was to decide Mafnas III.253  The CNMI Supreme Court had
reversed the Superior Court’s ruling for the plaintiff in the land title dis-
pute, but the Ninth Circuit now ruled the CNMI court had no authority to
hear an appeal the Ninth Circuit previously dismissed; thus, the Superior
Court’s judgment was reinstated.  The CNMI Supreme Court was suc-
cessor to the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division, with “no greater ju-
risdictional power over this case than the Appellate Division had after
our dismissal.”  That dismissal “left the Appellate Division with no juris-
diction to disturb the judgment of the CNMI Superior Court, [so] the
CNMI Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to disturb that judgment.”254
The long history of the case prompted a further negative comment from
Judge Goodwin to his Pacific Islands Committee colleagues: “The Ninth
Circuit has shot itself in the foot several times in connection with the
infamous Wabol and Mafnas cases.”255  In particular, he found Mafnas
“a good example of what happens when a panel that is familiar with a
case refuses to take it back, or the staff fails to ask them to take it back
when it returns.”256
B. FEDERAL COURT—CNMI COURT INTERACTION
The Ninth Circuit also decided, in published opinions, cases on other
aspects of appellate jurisdiction and particularly on interaction between
the CNMI courts and the federal courts, and there were also cases touch-
ing on basic relations between the United States. and the Commonwealth
of the Northern Marianas.  Touching on the jurisdictional changes was an
appeal from a murder conviction in the NMI courts, affirmed by the Dis-
trict Court’s Appellate Division.  The Ninth Circuit panel (Judges John
Noonan, Goodwin and Alex Kozinski) first distinguished Wabol and
held that the Court Reorganization Act could not withdraw appellate ju-
risdiction from the Ninth Circuit “where the appeal was currently pend-
252 Id. at 1072.
253 Aldan-Pierce v. Mafnas, 31 F.3d 756, 758–59 (9th Cir. 1994) (superseding 11 F.3d 923
(9th Cir. 1993)).
254 Id.
255 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Pacific Islands Committee (Jan. 24, 1994).
256 Id. In his memorandum, Judge Goodwin delineated the “unhappy story” of the case, which
had fifteen entries from the plaintiff’s initial NMI Superior Court victory through the petition for
rehearing in Mafnas III and thus did not include the revised Ninth Circuit opinion in that version of
the case.
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ing before our court.”257 Wabol had been before the Ninth Circuit when
the Act was passed, but in this instance the appeal was filed after the new
NMI court was created.  The result was that, because of a failure to ex-
haust remedies within the NMI courts, the Appellate Division lacked ju-
risdiction—and thus the Ninth Circuit itself lacked jurisdiction to hear
the appeal.  The Ninth Circuit judges, while saying the Appellate Divi-
sion’s motives were “praiseworthy,” countered that court’s view that no
other court was functioning because there were no judges or rules and the
CNMI Supreme Court existed only on paper; instead it was clear that the
case had been transferred to a functioning court as the CNMI Supreme
Court had issued its first opinion five months before the Appellate Divi-
sion decided the present case. Gioda v. Saipan Stevedoring258 had used
“manifest injustice” to decline to apply new law to a pending case, but
here there would be no manifest injustice by dismissing the appeal.
For fifteen years after the CNMI Supreme Court was established,
cases were to go from there to the Ninth Circuit and were to do so on
appeal.  This allowed the federal court to dismiss an appeal for want of a
substantial federal question, just as the U.S. Supreme Court has done
with appeal cases.  Illustrative is a case that arose when parents won a
jury verdict when they sued their sons for restitution and damages for
fraudulent inducement to sign over real property.259  The trial court’s
denial of a JNOV was affirmed by the CNMI Supreme Court, which,
however, ordered a remittitur.  That led to due process issues being
brought to the Ninth Circuit, where a panel of Judges Goodwin, Harry
Pregerson, and Eighth Circuit Judge Donald Lay said it lacked jurisdic-
tion over them because the CNMI Supreme Court had not said whether
its ruling was based on the U.S. or CNMI Constitution; moreover, the
issue had been waived by not having been raised in the opening brief.260
Interaction between CNMI courts and the Ninth Circuit also arose in
a dispute over the removal of the Special Assistant to the Governor for
Women’s Affairs.  District Judge Munson had found a property interest
in the individual’s continued employment, with no removal except for
cause, even during the term of a governor succeeding the one who made
the initial appointment; he also ruled that plaintiff had an implied right of
action for money damages.  The Ninth Circuit did not initially decide the
extent of the individual’s job protection but, acting as it might when
faced with a state law question to which the answer was not clear, certi-
fied two questions to the CNMI Supreme Court: (1) whether the individ-
257 N. Mariana Islands v. Kawano, 917 F.2d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1990).
258 Gioda v. Saipan Stevedoring, 855 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1988).
259 Santos v. Nansay Micronesia, Inc., 76 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
260 Id. Judge Goodwin was the author.
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ual could never be removed except for cause, even by a later governor, or
whether the protection applied only during the appointing governor’s
term, and (2) if “Yes” to (1), whether there was an implied right of action
against CNMI officials for a violation of Article III, Section 22, of the
Covenant.261 When the CNMI Supreme Court’s answered the first ques-
tion by saying that the “for cause” protection applied only during the
appointing governor’s term,262 the Ninth Circuit, per Judge Stephen Trott
(with  Judges Goodwin and Mary Murguia), ruled on the basis of that
answer that the termination of the individual did not violate due process:
there was no protected interest in continued employment beyond the term
of the appointing governor.263
The Ninth Circuit’s answer to a question about applicable statutes of
limitations affected which courts—NMI or federal—could entertain cer-
tain claims.  A person sued the CNMI government in federal court over a
rape by an employee of CNMI’s Immigration Services.
Because of the need for CNMI interpretation of certain issues, Judge
Munson declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the CNMI
claims until they had been litigated in the CNMI courts; the plaintiff then
filed there but was found “out of time.” When the CNMI Supreme Court
affirmed that ruling, plaintiff came back to federal court to amend her
complaint, but Judge Munson gave preclusive effect to the CNMI court’s
limitations ruling and denied the request.  The Ninth Circuit panel of
Judges Schroeder, Goodwin, and Murguia, after hearing the appeal at
Saipan, ruled that federal court claims were not precluded by the CNMI
court’s ruling that claims under CNMI law were barred by the statute of
limitations; it was acceptable to file in a different court with a longer
limits period; and res judicata based on a limitations period was not ap-
plicable if unfair.264
C. CORE UNITED STATES—CNMI RELATIONS
The cases discussed make clear that the Ninth Circuit had to grapple
with relations between the United States and CNMI courts. There were
also other cases that went to the core of relations between the United
States and the Commonwealth, although clearly they involved matters
261 Peter-Palican v. Gov’t of N. Mariana Islands, 673 F.3d 1013 (2012).  There had been an
earlier ruling, by a different Ninth Circuit panel (Judges Kozinski, Bybee, & Callahan) that the
acting governor had qualified immunity from suit. Peter-Palican v. Gov’t of N. Mariana Islands, 332
F. App’x 377 (9th Cir. 2009).
262 Peter-Palican v. Gov’t of N. Mariana Islands, No. 2012–SCC–0010–CQU, 2012 WL
2564359 (June 29, 2012).
263 Peter-Palican v. Gov’t of N. Mariana Islands, 695 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2012).
264 Zhang v. Dep’t of Labor & Immigration, 331 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
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within the courts’ ken.  Perhaps most illustrative is a case which arose
when the Interior Department’s Inspector General (IG) sought enforce-
ment of an administrative subpoena for tax records for a CNMI audit
under the Insular Areas Act.  The CNMI Supreme Court issued a tempo-
rary injunction against the release of tax information on the basis that the
audit would intrude on taxpayer privacy rights.  As the Governor would
not comply with the subpoena, the IG sought enforcement in federal
court and Judge Munson agreed.265
Interest in the appeal to the Ninth Circuit was high, evident from a
request for video coverage of argument, which the Ninth Circuit al-
lowed.266  One question was whether the Covenant restricted Congress’
legislative powers, but the crucial one was the extent of local self-gov-
ernment.  Judge Goodwin initially circulated an opinion stressing “a sub-
stantive right of local self-government free from congressional
interference,” with enforcement of the subpoena inconsistent with self-
government,267 but the other panel members disagreed.  Judge Ruggero
Aldisert, drawing on the situation in the Virgin Islands (part of the Third
Circuit, his court), agreed that the subpoena should be enforced: the fed-
eral government ought to be able to audit a territory receiving federal
dollars.  Judge Betty Fletcher, in persuasive views, argued that Congress
“has provided adequate statutory authority for the subpoena.” She
thought the Covenant allowed United States. legislation applicable to the
NMI as long as Congress made the applicability clear.   Moreover, she
found the relationship between the U.S. and CNMI “unique” and not like
federal-state relations, as the Covenant did not “support the equivalent of
full state sovereignty for the CNMI.”  She also thought that the federal
government’s interest was also clear, as “the fiscal relationship . . . is
critical,” with the United States giving CNMI financial aid (direct grants
and federally funded services).  As she concluded:
To say that the United States can’t require the CNMI to account for its
management of federal funds and the funds it must collect under . . .
tax provisions . . . does not seem a supportable result in light of the
United States’ unequivocal prerogative to intervene in at least some
aspects of CNMI life.268
265 Of Judge Munson’s view that the U.S. has the audit power despite the Covenant’s self-
government provision, a law clerk observed, “The locals call this colonialism.” United States ex rel.
Richards v. De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 1993); Memorandum from Edith Ramirez (law
clerk to Judge Goodwin) to Alfred T. Goodwin (Dec. 28, 1993).
266 United States ex rel. Richards v. De Leon Guerrero, Order (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 1993).
267 Alfred T. Goodwin, draft opinion circulated to panel re: Guerrero (June 7, 1993).
268 Memorandum from Betty B. Fletcher to panel re: Guerrero (June 25, 1993) (emphasis in
original).
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That argument led Judge Goodwin to change his position and circu-
late a new opinion, adopted by the panel, which stated, “The Insular Ar-
eas Act unambiguously provides the authority for the Inspector General
to conduct an audit of the CNMI”269 although the Act was silent con-
cerning subpoenas, but authority for the latter could be found in the In-
spector General Act.  As to the central question “whether the Insular
Areas Act conflicts with the self-governance provisions of the Cove-
nant,”270 Goodwin drew on Judge Fletcher’s argument to say, “The Cov-
enant has created a ‘unique’ relationship between the United States and
the CNMI, and its provisions alone define the boundaries of those rela-
tions.”271 He would not accept a reading of Section 105 of the Covenant
“carving out an area of ‘local affairs’ immune from federal legislation.”
Congress could not override the Covenant’s “fundamental provisions,”
but “[t]his does not mean that Congress may not pass any legislation
‘affecting’ the internal affairs of the CNMI.”272 Asserting the United
States’ “substantial federal interest in monitoring the CNMI’s collection
of taxes,” with federal aid that “inextricably links federal and CNMI in-
terests,” he found the subpoena was not “unwarranted federal interfer-
ence with the CNMI’s internal fiscal affairs.”273
Also going to the United States-CNMI relationship, because of the
question whether CNMI had certain protections from suit available to
United States states, was a case brought under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) by CNMI middle-management administrators seeking over-
time pay.  Judge Munson had given the government summary judgment.
The Goodwin-Schroeder-Tashima panel, hearing argument at Saipan,
faced a threshold question of whether the CNMI government was entitled
to sovereign immunity.  To reach that question, the panel had to decide
whether to dispose of the case on the merits—the plaintiffs would lose as
not entitled to FLSA protection—or to reach the sovereign immunity
question first; they decided on the latter sequence. The judges looked at
recent Supreme Court cases, at Puerto Rico’s relation to the United
States, and at an earlier case that held there was no Eleventh Amendment
immunity in a § 1983 case,274 and held that CNMI was not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity: the Covenant did not incorporate the
Eleventh Amendment, there was no reason to question the circuit’s ear-
269 United States ex rel. Richards v. De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1993).
270 Id.
271 Id. at 754.
272 Id. at 755.
273 Id.
274 Fleming v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 837 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1988).
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lier ruling, and the CNMI had waived its common law sovereign
immunity.275
Also before the Ninth Circuit was a matter of governmental powers
within CNMI, a challenge to the governor’s vetoes of line-item appropri-
ations.  District Judge Alfredo Laureta had given summary judgment to
the Governor.  The Ninth Circuit, for whom Third Circuit Judge Arlin
Adams wrote,276 found a federal question was presented so the appeal
was properly before that court but then found a lack of standing as the
individual had not shown harm to himself rather than only to all Island of
Rota residents.277
The Ninth Circuit also decided another aspect of the CNMI govern-
ment’s basic authority—its control of immigration to the islands through
the NMI Nonresident Workers Act (NWA).  In a suit brought in the
CNMI courts but removed to federal court, Judge Munson gave the
CNMI government partial summary judgment, a settlement was reached
on most matters, and the judge then dismissed plaintiff’s § 1981 claim,
and a Ninth Circuit panel of Judges Goodwin, Schroeder, and Wallace
affirmed.  However, on the panel’s way to that result, there was some
back-and-forth about whether to apply a rational basis level of scrutiny to
the restrictions on migration or something more; agreeing not to address
that matter, the judges ruled under both rational basis and intermediate
scrutiny.  The panel initially agreed to reverse and remand for the district
court to consider the relation between § 1982 and the Covenant as to
immigration authority.  However, after prodding by Judge Wallace, the
judges agreed to uphold CNMI’s authority coming from Congress
through the Covenant.  Judge Goodwin’s opinion stated that plaintiffs
had adequately pled a claim under § 1981, which “prohibits governmen-
tal discrimination on the basis of alienage.”278 While rejecting the argu-
ment that the Covenant gave CNMI plenary power over regulation of
aliens, he held that the NWA did not violate either non-resident workers’
equal protection rights or their substantive due process rights and on that
275 Norita v. N. Mariana Islands, 331 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 2003).  As Judge Goodwin
developed his opinion, he was urged to strengthen it by Judge Schroeder. See Memorandum from
Mary Schroeder to panel re: Norita (April 22, 2003). Taking a shot, she asked, “Why should we be
suggesting that sovereign immunity for the corrupt and inexperienced government of CNMI should
be recognized when our cases are clear?”
276 Initially, the panel’s opinion was by Judge Goodwin, with Judge Adams dissenting, but
Judges Goodwin and Farris found that dissent persuasive, and Judge Adams thus wrote for the panel.
277 Judge Goodwin’s law clerk argued to him that there was injury (a loss of things that could
have been obtained if the money had been appropriated). Memorandum from Laurel Terry to Alfred
T. Goodwin (Aug. 7, 1981). Taisacan v. Camacho, 660 F.2d 411, 411 (9th Cir. 1981).
278 Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 740 (9th Cir. 2004).
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basis affirmed Judge Munson’s dismissal of the § 1981 claim.279  Mak-
ing clear the judges’ difficulty in dealing with the claims before them,280
Judge Goodwin said that “the NWA withstands challenge” only at a cer-
tain “level of abstraction” and left open the possibility that individual
NWA provisions might fail to “satisfy a more focused Equal Protection
challenge.”281
D. OTHER CASES
Not all NMI cases before the Ninth Circuit raised questions of court
jurisdiction or governmental structure, as some raised standard questions
found in cases before a U.S. court of appeals.  In an appeal of a convic-
tion under the Hobbs Act (interference with commerce by extortion), a
panel of Judges Beezer, Goodwin, and Thomas Nelson initially issued an
unpublished memorandum to affirm the conviction on the basis of harm-
less error. Then, after a petition for rehearing, the panel issued a pub-
lished opinion authored by Judge Beezer reversing the district court on
the ground that the indictment failed to state an essential element, which
defendant had claimed prior to trial.282  Judge Goodwin also participated
in a case in which the claim was lack of notice of a Land Commission
hearing so that land was obtained by treachery.  The courts below had
been divided: the CNMI trial court set aside Commission determinations
but the District Court’s Appellate Division (Judges Alfred Lauretta, Wil-
liam Enright [S.D. Cal.], and Robert E. Moore [Commonwealth trial
judge]) had reinstated the Commission ruling.  The Ninth Circuit (Judges
Choy, Goodwin, and Kennedy) affirmed in a per curiam opinion, saying
notice need not be given to a landowner’s land trustee where the land-
owner himself had notice, nor was there abuse in not looking to the land-
owner’s competence.283
Other cases from NMI that were disposed of by non-precedential
“unpublished” memorandum dispositions included a brief dismissal for
“lack of a genuine federal issue,” with a citation to an earlier Ninth Cir-
cuit case,284 and fisheries, employment, and criminal cases.  Both a fish-
eries case and a personnel matter, like one of the published opinions,
279
“Although we reject the district court’s conclusion that Sagana did not properly plead his
§1981 claim, we affirm the district court’s dismissal on its merits, consistent with our holding on the
equal protection claim.” Id. at 743.
280
“Upon review, our efforts are somewhat encumbered by the bulk and vague contours of
Sagana’s claim.” Id. at 736.
281 Id. at 741, 743.
282 United States v. Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999).
283 Pangelinan v. Tudela, 733 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
284 Dela Cruz & Cheng v. Hotel Nikko Saipan, No.  98-15117 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999).
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posed a question of the applicability of federal law in CNMI.  When a
company sought a declaration that the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation
and Management Act285 and regulations were not applicable there, Dis-
trict Judge Laureta issued a preliminary injunction, but with Presidential
Proclamation 4726 having suspended operation of U.S. vessel documen-
tation laws in NMI, then found the case moot.  The Ninth Circuit (Judges
Goodwin, Charles Merrill, and J. Blaine Anderson) affirmed, as nothing
remained to be decided because the Proclamation gave plaintiffs the right
to fish with their vessel.286  The personnel case was a suit under FLSA
against an employer by former contract employees; there the court held
that, under the Covenant, FLSA’s minimum wage provisions were not
applicable in CNMI although the Act’s overtime provisions were and
that as the latter did not apply in this case, Judge Munson had properly
dismissed the FLSA claims.  However, it was error to have dismissed the
CNMI and common law claims for lack of jurisdiction: as diversity-of-
citizenship jurisdiction was satisfied, the case was remanded for consid-
eration of those claims.287  There was also a fairly standard employment
discrimination case with claims against the school system for non-ap-
pointment to various positions and retaliation, where the Ninth Circuit
panel288 affirmed summary judgment for the government.  There were no
protected property and liberty interests here, and there had been no con-
stitutional violation as to claims of failure to respond to inquiries made as
part of the individual’s job.289
The most involved criminal appeal was from convictions for kidnap-
ping, assault and battery, and attempted rape, which the District Court’s
Appellate Division had affirmed; at issue in the Ninth Circuit appeal
were admission of and sufficiency of the evidence.  Affirming in a mem-
orandum disposition (by Judge Goodwin), the panel found the evidence
more than sufficient to support the conviction; inconsistencies in testi-
mony “were vigorously pointed out to the jury by defense counsel,” and
it was the jury’s duty to weigh what it had heard.290 Nor were there
grounds to complain about what the defendant’s witness (the CNMI At-
torney General, who handled the preliminary investigated) said about the
rape victim’s emotional state.  Language problems of a multi-lingual so-
285 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (Westlaw 2015).
286 Marianas Fisheries, Inc. v. Kreps, 676 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1982) (table).
287 Abellanosa v. L&T Int’l Corp., 283 F. App’x 572 (9th Cir. 2008).  The panel was Judge
Pamela Ann Rymer, who wrote the disposition; Judge Goodwin; and Judge Sandra Ikuta.
288 Judges Thomas Nelson, author of the disposition; Charles Wiggins; and Goodwin.
289 Angello v. CNMI Pub. Sch. Sys., 166 F.3d 342 (9th Cir. 1998) (table).  The unsigned
disposition was written by Judge Nelson.
290 N. Mariana Islands v. Wabol, 734 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1984) (table).
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ciety had been present in the courtroom, although the judges found no
prejudice to defendant from them:
The victim’s first language is Carolinian, second is Chamorran, and
she apparently speaks only halting English.  The trial was conducted
in English, with translation when necessary.  The physician was a
mainlander who does not speak the native tongues.  The chief prosecu-
tor also had to communicate with the victim through interpreters.  Re-
view of the transcript indicates that communication with the victim
was at times difficult, apparently because of the language problems.291
Less difficult was an appeal from a conviction for conspiracy and
alien smuggling, in which defendant claimed the government had repatri-
ated potentially exculpatory witnesses before a defense attorney was ap-
pointed.  The panel (Paez, Graber, Goodwin) said appellant failed to
show that the government acted in bad faith and that the repatriation was
“not the result of a scheme to obtain a tactical advantage over Defen-
dant.”292  Likewise, in an appeal from another conviction for smuggling
undocumented aliens, a panel of Judges Schroeder, Goodwin, and Dis-
trict Judge Lloyd George (D. Nev.) found “overwhelming” evidence of
the smuggling, with the evidence of defendant’s intent to enter a non-
designated port “easily sufficient, if not overwhelming.”293  And the
same panel, in a disposition Judge Goodwin prepared, affirmed a convic-
tion for conspiracy to collect extension of credit by extortion, which had
been followed by denial of a motion to acquit.  A rational trier of fact,
said the panel, could reasonably infer that the defendant did the act de-
spite his changed appearance.294
VI. BEYOND GUAM AND THE NORTHERN MARIANAS
While most of Judge Goodwin’s judicial involvement in the south
Pacific concerned Guam and the Northern Marianas, his contacts through
the Pacific Islands Committee led to invitations to sit in other venues.
One was American Samoa, where his appointment came from the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior, and he also was invited to sit in the Marshall
Islands and in the Federation of Micronesia.
291 Id.
292 United States v. Peng, 2 F. App’x 735, 736 (9th Cir. 2001).
293 United States v. Fleming, 146 F. App’x 232, 232 (9th Cir. 2005).
294 United States v. Yan, 146 F. App’x 906, 907 (9th Cir. 2006).
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A. AMERICAN SAMOA
On the request of Chief Judge Michael Kruse of the High Court of
American Samoa, Ninth Circuit Chief Justice J. Clifford Wallace agreed
that two judges would assist with the appellate calendar there in March
or April 1992, and Judge Goodwin was appointed to serve as an Acting
Associate Justice of the High Court by Secretary of the Interior Manuel
Lujan, with the Interior Department paying travel funds from California
to Samoa.  As Justice Kruse told Goodwin, the cases to be heard were a
“varied mix” and “a few of the cases are peculiarly local in flavor.”295
That mix was also true of later court calendars, such as the one in
1997.  In 1996, Judge Goodwin, as chair of the Pacific Islands Commit-
tee, worked with Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., to find two judges to go to
American Samoa for a session the local court had moved from February
to April 1997 to accommodate judges going on to attend the Pacific Is-
lands Judicial Conference in Sydney, Australia.  As a result of an under-
standing between the High Court and the Ninth Circuit that produced
some control over who sat in Samoa, the judges were to be drawn from
the Pacific Islands Committee.  As Judge Goodwin explained: “This ar-
rangement was worked out some years ago when various judges were
applying directly to the Secretary of the Interior and were showing up in
Samoa without any significant input from either the High Court or the
Circuit.”296 Characterizing the trip, Goodwin wrote, “If two of our judges
go to Australia via Samoa, some senator may think it is a junket, but the
work is real.  Getting there is difficult and tiresome.  Being there is o.k.
but there is more work than most travelers want.”297
Not surprisingly, Judge Goodwin was one of the judges appointed
on Chief Justice Kruse’s recommendation by Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt.298  In the April 1997 sitting, most cases were heard by five
judges—Judges Goodwin and Wallace with either Chief Justice Kruse,
Justice Lyle Richmond, or District Judge John Ward,299 and two of some
five native judges.300  The court filed some opinions during the week the
appellate court sat while others were filed in June or July; Judge Good-
win did not write any of the opinions, all of which were unanimous.  The
cases included a number of fairly typical criminal appeals.  One from a
295 Letter from Michael Kruse to Alfred T. Goodwin (Dec. 24, 1991).
296 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Pacific Islands Committee (Oct.1, 1996).
297 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Procter Hug, Jr. (Oct. 7, 1996).
298 Letter from Bruce Babbitt to Alfred T. Goodwin (Mar. 24, 1997).
299 This depended on who had presided at trial, so a judge would not sit on an appeal from his
own ruling.
300 The five native judges, two of whom sat in most cases, were Sagapolutele Palaeoia,
Tapopo Vaifanua, Mamea Sala, Jr., Atiulagi Pese, and Lognai Siaki.
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jury conviction for DUI case raised a number of questions: sufficiency of
the evidence, problems with closing argument, convictions for both
DUIL and Careless Driving, and an alleged penalty for using a trial.  The
court rejected all the claims in affirming the conviction.301  Also af-
firmed was a conviction for larceny when a person used a bank loan for a
house for other purposes.302 However, an appeal from a drug and gun
conviction resulted in a reversal, as the evidence did not show that defen-
dant had dominion over the land on which the marijuana plants were
growing.303
Among the also-typical civil appeals, some were resolved by proce-
dural rulings, in which the court affirmed the denial of modification of
the filing date for notice of appeal, affirmed a trial court order of remand,
and reversed the dismissal of a case on a motion for reconsideration and
a new trial on the basis of the motion.304  In a case stemming from a
dispute over a lease purchase agreement for airplanes and parts in which
both parties sued for noncompliance and in which the FAA was also
involved, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s injunction against
the plaintiff and appointment of a trustee for both parties.305  In a suit for
unpaid compensation for services with a counterclaim for damages from
defects in the design and installation of a skylight at an office building,
Judge Goodwin wrote to affirm the judgment for the counter-claimant.306
And in a tort claims suit against the government for failing to provide
adequate security for the waterfront area, where plaintiff was injured
while returning to his ship, the appellate panel, also per Judge Goodwin,
affirmed summary judgment for the government.307
The cases “local in flavor” to which Justice Kruse had referred in-
volved the registration of an honorific title (“matai”), a claim to succes-
sion to such a title, and yet another matai title claim, with all the lower
court rulings affirmed.308 In the last of these, from Pago Pago, there was
an issue of disqualification of a Samoan judge for possible partiality and
another issue dealing with genealogy, where the appellate court said it
301 Antonio Pule v. American Samoa Government, AP 09-76 (filed April 11, 1997).
302 Leiataua v. American Samoa Government, AP 022-95 (filed April 9, 1997).
303 Suani v. American Samoa Government, AP 02-96.
304 South Pacific Island Airsystems v. American Samoa Government, AP 021-95 (filed Apr.
11, 1997); Ale v. Reid Stevedoring, AP 19-95 (filed June 9,1997); Pal Air International v. Porter, AP
016-96 (filed Apr. 9, 1997).
305 Bendall v. Samoa Aviation, AP 18-95 (filed Apr. 14, 1997).
306 G.M. Meredith & Associates v. Blue Pacific Management Corp., AP 17-95 (filed Apr. 10,
1997).
307 Bradcock v. American Samoa Government, AP 16-95 (filed Apr. 10, 1997).
308 Lealai v. Aoelua, AP 02-95 (filed Apr. 11, 1997); Fela v. Tauiliili, AP 9-95/10-95/11-95/
12-95/13-95 (filed June 6, 1997); Tuaolo v. Vaivao/Faate’A v. Vaivao, AP 06-85/07-95 (filed July
1997).
57
Wasby: Trial, Appellate, and Committee Work in the South Pacific
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2015
250 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
would not reweigh the evidence.  There were also land disputes, one of
which was a condemnation case in which the Appellate Division, in a
Goodwin opinion, affirmed the government’s fee simple title in land con-
demned for airport purposes.309  Another case involved whether a trans-
fer of a 20-year beneficial interest in land was alienation of the land, and
if the answer to that question was “Yes,” whether the American Samoa
Code barring alienation to non-Samoans was unconstitutional.  Per Judge
Wallace, the court held that transfer is alienation but the Code restriction
satisfied strict scrutiny review.310
Judge Goodwin sat on the High Court’s Appellate Division again in
June 1999, this time with fellow Pacific Islands Committee member
Judge Alex Munson (D. NMI).  Most of the panels had five judges but
some had only four.  Many of the dispositions took the form of unsigned
orders or per curiam opinions, and all were unanimous; quite a number
were filed during the judge’s time there, with the others filed shortly
after.  Many cases were dismissed on procedural grounds, such as for
failure to file a brief311 and, at counsel’s request, for failure to move for a
new trial within ten days,312 and the court also denied one motion to
dismiss an appeal over a timing question but did grant a motion to dis-
miss an appeal.313
There were three criminal cases on the calendar.  In a sentencing
case, work release had been denied after a guilty plea to felony driving
with a suspended license.  The court, vacating and remanding, held that
the trial court did have discretion about sentencing alternatives and could
have granted work release.314  In the other two criminal appeals, both
involving drugs, the convictions were affirmed.  One was from a convic-
tion for possession of methamphetamine, in which the trial judge had
ruled alleged misconduct by government officers harmless as the defense
could respond in open court.315  A search warrant for marijuana was at
issue in an appeal from a conviction for having a controlled substance.
Judge Goodwin, in ruling that there was probable cause for the warrant
and no basis for a Franks hearing concerning affidavits, disposed of each
of defendant’s arguments: The evidence was sufficient to support the
309 American Samoa Government v. Meredith, AP 08-95 (filed Apr. 14, 1997).
310 Craddick Development v. Craddick, AP 014-95 (filed July 22, 1998). Judge Ward had
drafted the opinion for the court, but Judge Wallace couldn’t agree and Judge Goodwin joined Judge
Wallace, who wrote for the court, with Ward filing a separate concurrence in the result.
311 Suani v. American Samoa Government, AP 19-97; Sale v. Leaea, AP 6-98 (filed June 24,
1999).
312 Amerika Samoa Bank, no docket number.
313 Safue v. Iona, AP 25-98 (filed June 24, 1999); Mailei v. Fanene, AP 02-98 (date
uncertain).
314 Sagapolutele v. American Samoa Government, AP No. 22-98 (filed June 25, 1999).
315 Pua’A v. American Samoa Government, AP 07-97 (filed June 28, 1999).
58
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol45/iss3/3
2015] Trial, Appellate, and Committee Work in the South Pacific 251
conviction.  In requesting an in camera hearing about revealing the iden-
tification of an informant, defendant had failed to provide a transcript or
other documents, which Goodwin said, “makes it virtually impossible to
evaluate this argument . . . .  Samana has provided this court nothing
upon which this court can base a conclusion that [the trial] court abused
its discretion.”316  Furthermore, claims concerning the chain of custody
of evidence had likewise been made “without any supporting evidence or
documents.”  While the defendant was entitled to notice about sentencing
enhancement based on a prior crime, there was evidence he did receive
such notice and had the opportunity to speak to recidivism.317
As in Judge Goodwin’s earlier sitting on this court, there were
claims to matai title to be decided.  In one, the court had to deal with clan
support, leadership, and the value of the title, while in another, where the
opinion discussed clan and family matters, the court remanded because
of an error in finding that the defendant had the support of a majority or
more of the family’s clans.318  Also related to family matters was affirm-
ance of a trial court’s denial of a request to bury a relative on another’s
land.319  There was also a divorce case in which the appellate court af-
firmed the trial court’s granting of custody of children to the father but
the mother had sought a new trial.320
A land case before the judges was a suit to set aside land registra-
tion. The High Court’s Lands & Title Division had affirmed the registra-
tion, but the Appellate Division found the registration invalid and so
reversed and remanded.321  The trial court was also reversed in a case
over a ship explosion, where the ship’s owner sued the supplier of the
exploded oxygen tanks; plaintiff had received a judgment but the trial
division had vacated it.  The legal fight was over the corporation to
which the check was made, as one had appeared to have merged into
another.  In ruling that while the trial court could vacate the judgment,
the appellate judges pointed out that the trial division had misread com-
mon law about foreign corporations’ capacities and on remand should
follow California law.322  Denial of prejudgment interest was affirmed in
another case, thought to be “an appropriate one in which to treat the
presumption favoring interest as overcome by the facts,” because “[t]he
316 American Samoa Government v. Saman, AP 20-97 (filed June 25, 1999).
317 Id.
318 Pili v. Tagaloa, AP 10-98 (filed July 27, 1999); Tagoilelagi v. Ulimasoa, AP 24-98 (filed
1998).  In the latter, the court, because it was already remanding for the error, also remanded con-
cerning recusal.
319 Noa Lafi v. Maugaoteg, AP 15-96 (filed Aug. 24, 1999).
320 Sinavaiana v. Enright, AP 08-98 (filed, June 25 1999) (opinion by Goodwin, J.).
321 Yuen v. Tuitele, AP 14-98 (filed July 27, 1999).
322 Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, AP 12-96 (filed June 28 1999).
59
Wasby: Trial, Appellate, and Committee Work in the South Pacific
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2015
252 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
amount of the debt was uncertain prior to the entry of judgment, and the
creditor seeking interest was largely responsible for the uncertainty and
the delay in the resolution of the case,”323 and a suit to recover $100,000
owed for cash advances to buy shark fins, with various trial court find-
ings as to differing instructions, resulted in a Goodwin opinion affirming
that was quite deferential to the trial court, something which he, as a
former judge, would have appreciated.  As Goodwin concluded:
The trial division was presented with a business dispute, to be resolved
in reliance on ambiguous fact, conflicting testimony and intentionally
deceptive accounting records.  The trial division was well-situated to
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and evidence offered by the
parties.  In the absence of credible evidence that casts doubts on the
factual findings of the trial court, this court must affirm the trial
court’s judgment.324
The judges for the Appellate Division’s April 2004 sitting were
Judge Goodwin, his Ninth Circuit colleague A. Wallace Tashima (each
wrote several opinions) and either Justices Richmond, Ward, or Kruse,
plus one or two of the native judges.  Again, some dispositions were filed
while the visitors were still in Samoa, a result of Judge Goodwin having
circulated draft opinions in lieu of bench memoranda.  He wrote in one
case, “This is . . . much too long to be published as an opinion, the detail
was included for the purpose of serving as a bench memorandum,”325
and, in another he stated “In lieu of a bench memorandum, I’ve prepared
this proposed disposition, subject to any amendments or revisions that
may be necessary after hearing the parties at oral argument.”326
None of Judge Goodwin’s opinions during this term of court came in
cases related to local culture, and the civil and criminal cases in which he
wrote were not unusual.  His two opinions in civil appeals were insur-
ance-related.  One was a workmen’s compensation case in which the in-
surer had denied a claim only to have benefits awarded by the
Commission, which the Trial Division had affirmed.  Affirming in turn,
the Appellate Division found substantial evidence to support the claim
and ruled that the Commission opinion met the proper standard for “unu-
sual stress” created on the job, so the award was in accord with law.
323 Korea Deep Sea Fishereries Association v. Ho Pyo Hong, AP 4-97 (filed June 25, 1999).
324 Samoa Sharkfin Trading Co. v. Hong, AP 1-98 (filing date uncertain, 1999).
325 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to A. Wallace Tashima re: Agasiva v. American
Samoa Government, AP 19-02 (Mar. 26, 2004).
326 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Michael Kruse & A. Wallace Tashima re: Na-
tional Pacific Insurance v. Commissioner, ASG Workmen’s Compensation Commission (Reardon,
real party in interest), AP 16-02 (filed April 12, 2004) (Mar. 24, 2004).
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That the insurance company had violated a number of procedural rules
had led Judge Goodwin to raise the possibility of sanctioning the com-
pany, adding, “It might be worthwhile to keep the insurance company in
court [instead of dismissing] for a good scolding and to publish the opin-
ion,”327 but the published opinion did not scold.
The other insurance case, based on a claim against the insurance
company for bad faith in paying under a policy, turned in part on the
rules for reformation of contracts.  The case resulted from a fire caused
by the negligence of an employee of a restaurant that leased the burned
building.  The lessee restaurant and its owner, the named insured,
claimed the $100,000 policy proceeds but the insurance company paid
only $64,300 into court and filed an interpleader action; there was also a
cross-claim and the restaurant owner sought additional damages.  The
Trial Division gave $100,000 to the building owner by indemnification.
In affirming the judgment, Judge Goodwin wrote that the trial court had
properly reformed the contract to reflect the actual ownership (not the
name of the chief on whose land the building was located) but had erred
in showing the building owner as the loss payee; this did not, however,
affect the ultimate order, as the building owner received by indemnifica-
tion even if not as the named loss payee.  The claim for additional dam-
ages and a tort claim had not been properly raised, said Goodwin, and
there was no error in finding that the building was a total loss.328
Judge Goodwin wrote to affirm in his three opinions in criminal ap-
peals.   A defendant convicted of burglary and sodomy on his 15-year-
old cousin had claimed a restriction on closing argument, but, citing a
Washington case, Judge Goodwin found the restriction acceptable “to
prevent the discussion of irrelevant, or inadmissible material.”329  He
noted the vigorous cross-examination and the full development of credi-
bility questions “that lurked in the two conflicting versions of the
charged conduct.”330  A conviction for assault with a bamboo stick raised
questions of jury instructions, not objected to at trial, sufficiency of the
evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel.  The appellate panel,
with no native judges seated, did find error in an instruction on the gov-
ernment’s burden (inadequately explained) but found the error harmless
as the result would have been the same with the proper instruction, and
the judges also found no error in instructing on a lesser-included
offense.331
327 Id.
328 Progressive Insurance Co. (Pago Pago) Ltd. v. Southern Star International dba Hong Kong
Restaurant, AP 11-02 (filed June 28, 1964).
329 American Samoa Government v. Etulae, AP 08-02 (filed Apr. 12, 2004).
330 Id.
331 Agasiva v. American Samoa Government, AP 19-02 (filed Apr. 12, 2004).
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In a child sexual abuse case, stemming from a conviction of a man
for inappropriately touching his daughter, defendant’s attorney had
wanted a mental exam of defendant as to both competency to stand trial
(and assist in his defense) and criminal intent.  The Appellate Division
said there was no real issue about competency and the defense had not
carried its burden of showing that the exam was necessary, as defen-
dant’s odd behavior was not sufficient.  Judge Goodwin did say that the
testimony about the victim by the doctor who examined her was hearsay
but the testimony “was also a legitimate part of the medical history the
doctor said she was required professionally and legally to ascertain in
cases where a child is examined in connection with a molestation investi-
gation.”332  That, however, left open what the jury could be told.  At
issue was whether, in the doctor’s recording and reporting, mention of
the perpetrator’s identity was essential.  It would not be admissible, said
Judge Goodwin, unless it was connected to the course of treatment and
indeed it was inadmissible, but that did not matter as it “did not affect a
substantial right of defendant’s,” it was cumulative, and it did not sway
the jury.333
Judge Goodwin also participated in two other criminal appeals—one
from a conviction for rape and kidnap, which was remanded for an evi-
dentiary hearing on juror misconduct, and the other from a conviction for
second degree murder (of an infant), which was affirmed.334 Among the
civil appeals in which he participated were those  involving four locked
containers of fabric and 92 sewing machines left on government land,
which the trial court had decided for the government (affirmed); a fall on
a fishing vessel, where the judgment for plaintiff was affirmed but the
award was vacated and remanded for an award of prejudgment interest; a
dispute over a sidewalk; and a breach of a lease agreement, with the trial
court generally affirmed but reversed as to a damage award for unpaid
utility bills.335
One part of the “local flavor” in the case mix came from an eviction
from family land, where the trial court judgment was vacated to allow a
comprehensive action over land claims and collateral issues, as certain
family members were indispensable parties.336 There were also several
332 Niupulusu v. American Samoa Government, AP 02-02 (filed June 28, 2004).
333 Id.
334 Fiu v. American Samoa Government, AP 07-01 (filed June 16, 2004); Ropati v. American
Samoa Government, AP 04-03 (filed July 27, 2004).
335 New Star Trading Co. v. American Samoa Government, AP 09-02 (filed July 28, 2004);
Sardina v. F/V Kassandra, AP 01-02 (filed July 27, 2004); Malala v. American Samoa Government,
AP 10-01 (filed April 12, 2004); Gebauer v. American Samoa Power Authority, AP 05-02 (filed
April 12, 2004).  There were also two cases dismissed on stipulation after settlement.
336 Kaleuati v. Iosefa, AP 17-02 (filed June 29, 2004) (Ward, J.).
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disputes over succession of matai titles.337 Wanting not to become im-
mersed in family disputes (at least, no more than necessary), Judge
Goodwin suggested to his colleagues that “commenting on the merits of
any candidate who is not a party to the appeal” be avoided because
[w]e can not predict nature and quality of future claims that may be
advanced within a family, and should not say anything in an opinion
that would give precedential weight to something the trial court said
by way of dicta with reference to the lineage or consanguinity of per-
sons who, even though parties at the trial level, are not party to this
appeal.338
He also suggested further narrowing this particular ruling by not reaching
“the broad statutory question of the effect of gender bias within a particu-
lar village or community” but instead leaving it to be “decided in a future
case where it is the decisive question before the court.”339  If the opinion
were to note that the trial court “did not address the question because it
concluded that the answer would not have affected the result,” counsel
would be more likely to “feel that we were paying attention to his argu-
ment if we spell out the proposition that an appellate court ordinarily
should not address a question which, on the facts of the pending case, is
hypothetical.”340
B. FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
Judge Goodwin also sat in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)
in 1995 and 2007,  thus more intermittently than in Guam, NMI, or even
American Samoa and the Marshall Islands.  When a need arose, e.g., on a
regular judge’s recusal, he was invited to sit on the three-judge Supreme
Court of the Federated States of Micronesia.  Arrangements for the
court’s session and for travel took up much of the communication be-
tween the judges (and staff).  Certainly by comparison with communica-
tion in a regular Ninth Circuit panel, it took much time for Judge
Goodwin to hear from other judges, and not just because he was in Cali-
fornia; in addition to rudimentary communication systems, the island
judges sitting with him seemed to wait on each other to act and did not
seem to “move paper” expeditiously.
337 Fanene v. Taci, AP 11-03; Akapo v. Ava, AP 08-03; Va-Afusuage v. Taei, AP 13-03 (all
filed May 6, 2004) (all by Richmond, J.).
338 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to panel members re: Va-Afusuaga v. Taci, AP
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In January 1995, Judge Goodwin heard two cases that were not par-
ticularly complex.  One was a divorce and child support case in which
certification to other courts was denied, no abuse of discretion was
found, and the child support award was found adequate.  The other, af-
firming after consolidating eleven appeals in which summary judgment
and an injunction against trespass on land had been granted, turned on
proper jurisdiction, to which most of Justice Richard Benson’s opinion
was devoted, and on a series of alleged trial court errors, including fail-
ure to give proper weight to custom.341
More involved was the third case, in which Judge Goodwin wrote
the court’s opinion.  It arose from a suit for compensation and damages
for property losses and personal injury as a result of actions by U.S.
civilians and military in the immediate post-World War II period of
1945–1949.  The trial court had dismissed the case on the basis that the
statute of limitations barred tort claims, but in doing so it had not ad-
dressed the sovereign immunity of the United States government or of
the Trust Territory, which was apparently immune from suit for inten-
tional torts.342  Sovereign immunity and its link to the statute of limita-
tions became the basis of dispute within the appellate court, where
serious substantive exchanges took place.  Justice Wainis Simina, who
was to dissent, believed the tort claims should not have been dismissed
and asserted that when the plaintiffs were first able to sue determined
when their cause of action accrued, a view Justice Goodwin and Justice
Martin Yinug did not share although Judge Yinug held somewhat
broader views of the reach of the waiver.  Judge Goodwin’s law clerk,
whose view was that the Compact did not waive U.S. sovereign immu-
nity, questioned whether waiver of immunity meant the U.S. then imme-
diately became liable for actions taking place long before; immunity, she
said, had not been waived for acts prior to the Compact of Free Associa-
tion between the FSM and the United States.343  The court was not able
to reach agreement, resulting in a 2-1 decision affirming the dismissal of
the claims as “appropriately disposed of by the trial court,” although Jus-
tice Goodwin wrote that some claims from the Fono Islands might still
be viable if brought in the proper forum, and the plaintiffs might still
bring claims under equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.344
341 Youngstrom v. Youngstrom, Appeal Case P2-1994; Luzama v. Ponape Enter. Co., P11-
1993 (both filed Feb. 16, 1995).
342 Takuo Alep v. U.S., FSM Appeal Case No. C5-1993 (filed July 1996).
343 Memorandum from Sophie Wingerden (law clerk to Judge Goodwin) to Alfred T. Good-
win re: Takuo Alep v. U.S., FSM Appeal Case No. C5-1993 (filed July 1996).  As a separate matter,
the Federal Tort Claims Act did not allow suits for acts in a “foreign country” like the FSM.
344 Takuo Alep v. U.S., FSM Appeal Case No. C5-1993 (filed July 1996).
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Justice Goodwin’s participation as Temporary Associate Justice in
2007 was to hear an election fraud case in which the appeal was from a
conviction for deprivation of rights and for threats in an official and po-
litical matter; a community’s mayor had told voters how to vote and had
said that voting for others was illegal, and government assistance had
been given only to those who cooperated.345  With the regular justices
having disqualified themselves, Judge Goodwin served as presiding
judge with Judges Aliksa V. Aliksa (Chief Justice of the Kosrae State
Court) and Benjamin Rodriguez (Associate Justice of the Pohnpei Su-
preme Court).  The court was assisted by the FSM Supreme Court’s Gen-
eral Counsel, Craig Reffner, who served as Judge Goodwin’s de facto
law clerk on the case.  The case was resolved in a straightforward man-
ner, with an across-the-board affirmance on finding the evidence suffi-
cient to support the conviction and the sentence reasonable.
On the way to the court’s result on the merits, however, there was
interesting by-play concerning what appeared to be two preliminary mat-
ters—the defendant’s request for release pending appeal, denied by both
the trial court and an appellate judge, and a request for “enlargement of
time” to file briefs, which Justice Goodwin could decide as a single
judge.  Goodwin observed to his colleagues that he took a fairly relaxed
view of requests for release pending appeal when sitting in Guam, al-
though he did balance “harm to the public and convenience to the pris-
oner,” and if there was little of the former, “then the prisoner can await
the appeal at home if he wishes.”
When sitting in the U.S. court in Guam, I usually was fairly per-
missive about release on bail pending appeal because the reality of
release on a small island is different from release in the continental
United States where a convicted person can put three or four thousand
miles between himself and his keepers, and may have no incentive to
stay in contact with his supervised release supervisor.346
While the justices were preparing for the case and before they had de-
cided this matter, they learned that the trial judge had granted parole to
defendant (for having served minimum statutory time). That mooted the
request, but the order had not reached the appellate court.
The attorney who had requested enlargement of time sought a still
longer period plus rescheduling of oral argument because of personal
travel to Europe.  Judge Goodwin’s initial reaction, like his reaction to
345 Wainit v. Federated States of Micronesia, Appeal No. C2-2006 (filed Apr. 2006).
346 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to other judges re: Wainit v. Federated States of
Micronesia, Appeal No. C2-2006 (Oct. 12, 2006).
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similar requests stateside, was not positive.  As he wrote to Reffner, “I
have caused the court staff to go to a considerable amount of trouble to
arrange somewhat complex air travel from California to Chuuk at a busy
time for everyone, including myself.  I object to letting counsel jerk the
court around because of his personal plans, important as they may be.”347
Further inquiry revealed, however, that the oral argument order had not
been served on counsel before he made his request.  That led to much
consideration of shifting oral argument ahead several months to March
2007, when Judge Goodwin could combine his FSM sitting with one he
had scheduled in the Marshall Islands, and the three judges did agree to
hear the case at the later date.
C. REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
Judge Goodwin was to sit a half-dozen times extending through
2007 on the three-judge Supreme Court of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands (RMI).  Both in his initial and later sittings, he was an “outside”
judge deciding big questions in a far-off republic, perhaps the primary
reason for his being asked to sit there, but the judges also heard matters
of local import, including family and clan relations.
Initially, with the RMI Cabinet having approved Goodwin’s appoint-
ment, Chief Justice Allen Fields requested his presence, along with that
of U.S. District Judge Samuel King of Hawai’i, because the two judges
were “well known in the Marshall Islands and command great respect.”
That was quite important, as “several important cases involving the Con-
stitution of the Marshall Islands and operation of the Government” were
to be heard.348 In addition to sitting with Justice Fields in 1999 and 2002,
Goodwin sat then and in following years with Magistrate Barry Kurren
(D. Hawai’i), who replaced Judge King as the other “outside” judge.  In
2004, Chief Justice Cadra wanted to have Judges Goodwin and Kurren
appointed permanently, saying it would “give some stability to the Court
and would prevent the necessity of multiple JSC [Judicial Service Com-
mission] meetings and Cabinet appointments.”349 Goodwin responded, “I
am willing to be appointed” again, although he was “not sure how much
longer or how often I can commit to travel.”350 In 2004, 2006, and 2007,
Goodwin sat with Chief Justice Daniel Cadra for most cases but also for
some with Judges Hickson and Ingram (2006) and Plasman (2007).
347 ATG, memorandum to Craig Reffner, judges, Oct. 28, 2006.
348 Letter from Allen P. Fields to Procter Hug, Jr. (Apr. 28, 1999).
349 Memorandum from Daniel Cadra to Alfred T. Goodwin & Barry Kurren (June 16, 2004).
350 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Judges Daniel Cadra & Barry Kurren (June 16,
2004).
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Justice Fields had sought Judges Goodwin and King for three partic-
ular cases in 1999.  One, which involved the court in familial relations,
involved a claim for some of the proceeds of land use payments for a
portion of the U.S. lease of Kwajalein atoll and a question of whether a
person was the plaintiff’s father.   The Traditional Rights Court, on
which Marshallese chiefs sat, had ruled that plaintiff was not the son of
the named individual and that an Iroij (chief) could not bind any succes-
sor to provide any share of possible amounts received. The case then
proceeded to the RMI High Court, which had issued the judgment neces-
sary for appeal to the RMI Supreme Court, and that court found no clear
error.351
The other two major cases to which Fields had referred in contacting
the judges concerned procedures in the RMI legislature, the Nitijela.
One, in which Judge Goodwin wrote the opinion, produced attacks on
the court and the judges and thus provides a view of judicial indepen-
dence in developing nations.352   Senators who, because of a pecuniary
conflict of interest were not allowed by the Speaker of the Nitijela to
vote on a bill removing a ban on gambling, brought a case in which they
claimed that the bill would not have passed had the votes of two been
counted and another had they been allowed to vote.  After that bill
passed, a bill banning gambling did pass and was properly recorded (en-
rolled).  The High Court, looking to the final enrollment of the bill as
“conclusive evidence that the statute was regularly and Constitutionally
enacted,”353 had dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim.  With Judge King writing, the Supreme Court
affirmed.354
The other Nitijela case, which immersed the judges in legislative
procedure, turned on the type of ballot to be used—open (wanted by the
President355) or secret (agreed and used)—in a vote of no confidence in
the President; there had been a majority but not the two-thirds vote nec-
essary for removal.  When proceedings resumed after a recess, the Presi-
dent and some Senators stayed away, creating the absence of a quorum;
once ten days had elapsed from the introduction of the no-confidence
351 Elmo v. Kabua, Civ. 97-05 (filed Oct. 1999), noted as Elmo v. Makamura, High Court No.
1996-175 by Allen P. Fields. Memorandum from Samuel King to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 14, 1990)
from which this description is taken.
352 Kabua v. Note, Civ. 98-03 (filed Sept. 1999).
353 Memorandum from Allen P. Fields to Alfred T. Goodwin & Samuel King re: Kabua v.
Note, Civ. 98-03 (July 14, 1999).
354 Kabua v. Note, Civ. 98-03 (filed Sept. 1999).
355
“[T]he President wanted an open ballot because as the Iroij (a Marshallese Chief) he does
have control over some of the Senators.  They would not want to vote contrary to his wishes.”
Memorandum from Allen P. Fields to Alfred T. Goodwin & Samuel King (July 14, 1999).
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motion, the Speaker and his allies claimed the motion was nullified.  Rul-
ing on claims by both sides, the High Court had decided in the Speaker’s,
not the President’s favor, but did not—based on what we would call the
“political question” doctrine—make a decision on the Nitijela’s rules.
The trial judge who made that ruling, Daniel Cadra, had been attacked
(anonymously) by an adviser to the President, an American attorney who
was later to attack the Supreme Court’s decision.  That led to Cadra’s
departure “before the end of his term, at the request of the President and
his Cabinet,”356 although he was later to return as Chief Justice.   Good-
win wrote for the three temporary Supreme Court Justices to affirm the
High Court.357
That, however, was not to be the end of the matter.  The President’s
adviser, one Lowe, almost immediately wrote to say the Cabinet wanted
the judges “to know that they were embarrassed and dismayed by the
glaring errors” allegedly in the opinion, including a number relating to
Nitijela procedure.358 Judges Goodwin and King did not respond, but the
departed Judge Cadra took issue with Lowe’s letter,359 and, more impor-
tantly, Chief Justice Fields could not abide criticism of the “excellent”
visiting judges who were not compensated for sitting.  Fields said that
the lawyer, Lowe, did not “understand the ethical duties imposed upon
an attorney” nor either the Marshallese or English languages as seen in
his interpretation of the rules.  Nor, said Fields, did Lowe understand an
independent judiciary. He emphasized this matter in noting “Lowe’s de-
sire to control the judiciary” as new chair of the Judicial Service Com-
mission, which evaluated those seeking judicial positions. Nor had Lowe
helped by calling attention to the Marshall Islands’ “reputation within the
United States Federal Courts, for interfering with the independence of
their Judiciary.”360
Judge Goodwin’s next sitting in the Marshall Islands again very
much involved him in a case where one of the judges spoke again to the
matter of judicial independence.  He also sat in a land rights case and
another civil suit with a default judgment for $4.2 million and a cross-
appeal for punitive damages, in which he wrote to affirm the High
356 Memorandum from Allen P. Fields to Alfred T. Goodwin & Samuel King (July 14, 1999).
357 In re the 19th Nitijela Constitutional Regular Session, 2 MILR 134 (1999) (Marsh. Is).
358 Letter from David Lowe (Special Counsel to the President) to the judges (Sept. 16, 1999),
later published as Supreme Court Ignorant?, MARSHALL ISLANDS J. (Oct. 1, 1999).
359 Daniel Cadra, letter to High Court (Oct. 8, 1999), calling Lowe “a word weasel . . . trying
to make an issue where none exists” and saying he “demonstrates his inability to properly read a
legal opinion.”
360 Letter from Allen P. Fields to President, Ministers and Cabinet Members, Members of the
Nitijela (Oct. 10, 1999).
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Court.361  The most controversial case put him in the midst of a suit—in
this instance by the RMI government—against the major tobacco compa-
nies.  The government sought to recover its costs for RMI residents’
medical expenses incurred as a result of their smoking.  When the plain-
tiffs’ expert’s model was defective and was re-run, it showed no dam-
ages, and the expert’s testimony was excluded as unreliable.  Judge H.
Dee Johnson, Jr., in the High Court, gave defendants summary judgment
on all but a Consumer Protection Act claim and then found no evidence
of damages; he was also caustic about lawyers who had sold the govern-
ment a bill of goods about the possibility of success of this sort of
litigation.
The defendants then sought a writ of prohibition or mandamus from
the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s jurisdiction.  This was
denied in a ruling by Justice Fields, who both took a slap at the law-
yers362 and discussed the RMI judiciary, attacks on it, and alleged inter-
ference by the government—the theme of his response to the criticism
leveled at the court in the 1999 Nitijela case.  Showing that they did not
join in this excursus, Judges Goodwin and Kurren concurred specially to
indicate, “We do not join in the historical material contained in the Order
for the reason that we do not believe that material to be necessary to our
decision on the removed question before us.”363
The appeal then proceeded to an affirmance in an opinion by Judge
Goodwin.  The first issue was the parties’ agreement to dismissal of the
Consumer Protection Act claim with prejudice, done to have a final order
for an appeal.  Here, speaking of the need to avoid piecemeal litigation,
Goodwin rejected the government’s request to review without requiring
that the dismissal be with prejudice.  On the reliability of evidence, he
found that “[t]he trustworthiness concern expressed in Daubert364 and its
progeny are applicable here” and that the High Court “aptly considered
those factors.”  He went on to remark that “[t]he courtroom is not the
appropriate venue for casual musings of scientists, and the High Court
361 Jack v. Hisiah, 2 MILR 206 (2002) (Marsh. Is) (filed Dec. 2002, opinion by Fields, J.),
and Air Marshall Islands v. Dornier Luftfahrt, 2 MILR 211 (2002) (Marsh. Is) (filed late Dec. 2002).
362
“While the attorneys appearing in this case are trained in the law in the United States and
some are licensed and continue to practice there, they have failed to cite any case from the United
States that prevents judges or jurors in those jurisdictions from hearing these same claims brought
before them.” Republic of Marshall Islands v. American Tobacco Co., 2 MILR 170, 171 (2001)
(Marsh. Is) (Order, by Fields, J., Mar. 14, 2001).
363 Id. at 178.
364 Republic of the Marshall Islands v. Am. Tobacco Co., 2 MILR 181, 188 (2002) (Marsh.
Is.); see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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properly discredited Dr. Miller’s testimony on the basis of his contradic-
tory opinions.”365
Moreover, the RMI government had “offer[ed] no evidence to quan-
tify” its claim that the tobacco companies’ marketing caused illness and
health care costs and no evidence had been provided on the proportion of
health care costs attributable to the companies’ misconduct, which was
not responsible for all smoking and all medical treatment of tobacco-
related illness: “Such a broad assertion cannot survive summary judg-
ment without evidentiary support.”366  Observing that “no one disputes
that smoking can have negative health effects, by itself,” he asserted that
“that truism does not translate into an actionable claim against Tobacco,”
and he concluded, “Without evidence linking Tobacco’s allegedly illegal
activities to claims of damages, we decline to consider the Government’s
claims beyond summary judgment.”367
In his later sittings in the Marshall Islands, Judge Goodwin was not
to encounter cases with such a level of controversy, but he did face cases
on a wide range of subjects, some with “local flavor” but many which
were routine litigation.  In 2004, in addition to an appeal from a tax con-
viction (affirmed),368 there was a suit over a contract for work on the
Kwajalein Atoll base.  There, when the contractor subcontracted some
work but denied a request for some employees to reside on the base, the
High Court found the United States. not immune from suit, but the Su-
preme Court reversed on sovereign immunity.369  The one case with po-
litical flavor stemmed from a complaint by twenty individuals against an
election officer that postal ballots had not been counted.  Per Judge
Goodwin, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal370 but
reversed the denial of a motion to amend the complaint and vacated as
moot the trial court’s alternative holding.
Judge Goodwin’s 2005 sitting saw two cases on rights and titles and
one in which he wrote the opinion affirming the High Court in a suit
against the government for the allegedly wrongful discharge of a police
officers, which had been dismissed as untimely for noncompliance with
365 Republic of the Marshall Islands v. Am. Tobacco Co., 2 MILR 181, 189 (2002) (Marsh.
Is.).
366 Id. at 191.
367 Id.
368 Republic of the Marshall Islands v. de Brum, 2 MILR 223 (2002) (Marsh. Is.) (filed c.
June, 2004).
369 Pac. Int’l, Inc. v. United States and United States Dep’t. of the Army, 2 MILR 244 (2004)
(Marsh. Is.) (filed c. June 2004).
370 Judge Goodwin wrote to his colleagues, “Judge Hickson was right about his lack of juris-
diction.  It would be necessary to file a new case with a live plaintiff.” Memorandum from Alfred T.
Goodwin to judges re: Momotaro v. Benjamin, 2 MILR 237 (2004) (Marsh. Is.) (filed June 16, 2004)
(May 27, 2004).
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the Government Liability Act.371  In 2006, he appears not to have written
any opinions in the several cases in which he participated: an affirmance
of a High Court dismissal of a criminal prosecution for want of prosecu-
tion, a land claims case, likewise dismissed for lack of prosecution, and
an employment discrimination case for back pay when the plaintiff with
stated qualifications was not hired and the person hired was without
qualifications.372 In the last case, in which there were problems with the
untimely filing of a brief and the need for an attorney, the High Court
had ruled that a job announcement was not an offer.  And in 2007, again
with no Goodwin opinions for the court, the justices held a status confer-
ence with parties and remanded to the High Court to hold proper pro-
ceedings under the Rules of the Traditional Rights Court.  They also
affirmed and dismissed appeals in two other cases—one as to land own-
ership, where a motion to intervene had been denied and this successor
action was dismissed for res judicata and laches, the other an attempt to
obtain relief from a $12,000 default judgment in a suit by an unpaid
seller of goods.373
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Relatively few people in the mainland United States know of federal
judges’ involvement in judicial systems far beyond our shores.  This Ar-
ticle, by looking at Judge Alfred T. Goodwin as he sat not only in the
federal judicial districts of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, but
also in other south Pacific venues, has presented a picture of the types of
cases heard by U.S. judges in such places.  These include the standard
criminal and civil cases not unlike those one would find in most federal
and state courts as well as those deriving from the local culture, such as
those on the powers of titled chiefs, and more politically sensitive cases.
The latter encompass those relating to judicial relations between the is-
land judiciary and the federal court system or between the island govern-
ment and the United States government, with the latter of those providing
a good window through which to get a sense of the United States’ rela-
tions with its territories.  The cases that Judge Goodwin decided as a trial
371 Tibon v. Jihu, 2003-001 3 MILR 1 (2005), and Jihu v. Alik, 3 MILR 1 (2005) (Marsh. Is.)
(filed Mar. 2005) (per Cadra, J.); Bejen v. Republic of Marshall Islands, 3 MILR 8 (2005) (Marsh.
Is.) (filed Mar. 2005).
372 Republic of Marshall Islands v. Lemark, 3 MILR 19 (2006) (Marsh. Is.) (filed June 2006);
Peter v. Katjang, 1999-003 (filed June 2006); Alik v. Public Service Commission, 3 MILR 13,
(2006) (Marsh. Is.) (filed Mar. 24, 2006).
373 Hito v. Abner, 2002-03 (filed Mar. 14, 2007); Ueno v. Hosja, 3 MILR 29 (2007) (Marsh.
Is.) (filed May 17, 2007); Pacific Basin v. Mama Store, 3 MILR 34 (2007) (Marsh. Is.) (filed May
17, 2007).
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judge, as a member of the local appellate courts, and on the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals are central to this Article.  However, also very impor-
tant are the mixed roles played by U.S. judges sitting in the south Pa-
cific—of being not only judges hearing cases but also makers of policy
concerning the court system, which entails consideration of legislative
proposals.  Seeing these dual roles should add to our limited knowledge
of the extra-judicial roles our federal judges perform.
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